## AFFIRMATIVE

### Perm Do CP

#### “The” allows particulars

**Random House 6** Unabridged Dictionary, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/the)---GDS> T File

(used, esp. before a noun, with a specifying or particularizing effect, as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of the indefinite article *a* or *an*): the book you gave me; Come into the house.

### NATO-Turkey Coop Good

#### Cooperation with Turkey draws them into NATO-led initiatives

Kirişci 22, nonresident senior fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe's Turkey Project at Brookings, with an expertise in Turkish foreign policy and migration studies. From 2013 until 2020, he was TÜSİAD senior fellow at Brookings and director of the Turkey Project (Kemal, “Can the Russia-Ukraine crisis offer an opportunity to re-anchor Turkey in NATO?,” Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/16/can-the-russia-ukraine-crisis-offer-an-opportunity-to-re-anchor-turkey-in-nato/)//BB

However, all is not lost. The Ukrainian crisis has increasing questions about the wisdom of Turkey’s cozy relationship with Russia and a greater appreciation of NATO’s value, recently reiterated by two prominent retired Turkish ambassadors. Interestingly, their reasoning is not that different than the Turkish diplomats and ministers of foreign affairs from the 1940s and 1950s who played a central role in negotiating Turkey’s entry into NATO, revealing the continuity that comes with geography but also the persistent commitment to a Western vocation dating from Ottoman times. Moving forward, revitalizing Turkey’s traditional Western vocation and its NATO membership will be dependent on two developments. Erdoğan is failing to address Turkey’s mounting problems. His approval ratings have dropped from almost 56% at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic to 38.6% at the end of 2021, while the governing AKP has also steadily lost support and was down to 23.9%. Under these circumstances, the opposition stands a growing chance of winning the next elections if they are reasonably free. However, the opposition led by the social democratic People’s Republican Party (CHP) has remained by and large quiet on foreign policy issues and shied from advocating pro-Western policies. This would need to change, and the opposition would need to adopt an informed and rational platform that dispels prejudices and better explains to the public why revitalizing stronger relations with the West would benefit Turkey’s interests. The West needs to do its part too. Foremost, there needs to be a recognition that there is political change in the offing in Turkey. It is far from certain but there is a decent likelihood that the next elections would be won by the opposition. In the meantime, it will be important for the U.S. to recognize that the current crisis over Ukraine has once more shown the strategic value of Turkey to NATO and develop, together with other allies, a constructive narrative that would welcome a post-election Turkey back into the core of the trans-Atlantic alliance. Given the stalling out of its enlargement process, the EU is unlikely to be able to play the robust role it did in reforming Turkish democracy in the 2000s. But just like 70 years ago, Turkey’s NATO membership could become a conduit for mutually reinforcing Turkey’s Western vocation and its democracy while benefiting European security, including that of Ukraine.

#### Incorporating Turkey into the plan ensures Turkish buy-in

**Got ‘20** – Author based in Europe and works on security and defense issues (Antoine, War on the Rocks, “TURKEY’S CRISIS WITH THE WEST: HOW A NEW LOW IN RELATIONS RISKS PARALYZING NATO”, November 19, 2020, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/turkeys-crisis-with-the-west-how-a-new-low-in-relations-risks-paralyzing-nato/> )//RG

Ultimately, however, fears of a Turkish realignment with Russia are likely overblown. Moscow and Ankara’s relations have historically been fraught, and the recent rapprochement stems more from opportunism and coinciding interests than a major reorientation in Turkish foreign policy at the expense of its traditional alliances. In fact, Turkey’s forceful posturing is making it steadily more at odds with Russia in conflict environments where both operate, including Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, and Libya. Its growing involvement in the Caucasus, for instance, has brought it dangerously close to armed confrontation with NATO’s primary contestant, Russia, which supports Armenia under the Collective Security Treaty Organization framework. This was highlighted by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s underscoring of Russia’s “obligations to Armenia.” Though the violence ended there, Turkey’s proxy saber-rattling contributes to increase risks of accident or miscalculation leading to armed confrontation with Russia — something all parties are eager to avoid. With antagonistic security interests at stake, Turkey and Russia are ultimately more likely to balance against rather than align with each other, though several NATO allies continue to regard Ankara’s ties to Moscow with a deep-seated sense of suspicion. A Constructive Role for NATO As Turkey and the European Union ramp up their rhetorical joust, it is perhaps no surprise that NATO is better placed to act as a forum for the de-escalation of the crisis. It is indeed Turkey’s membership to NATO, and the daily staff-to-staff contacts which it generates, that makes the alliance able to work as a platform where their diplomats can negotiate, exchange information, and address issues of common strategic interest with European counterparts, thus helping to undermine the “us-versus-them” mentality which at times prevails across E.U. institutions. As the latter hardens its rhetoric, NATO can generate the much-needed safety valve where diplomatic efforts have a chance of succeeding**.** To this end, the alliance should capitalize on the consultative function of its institutions to allow for parties to sit together, express their views and concerns on national and collective security considerations, and improve mechanisms to reach a consensus on the means to address any perceived challenges. Consultations have indeed always been at the core of the alliance, and remain important vectors for addressing intermember disagreements. The recent announcement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg that a military de-confliction mechanism would be established between Greece and Turkey is but one example of the productive results that such diplomatic efforts can yield, and an encouraging sign that the two sides are not willing to see their relations deteriorate further. Yet a limited arrangement between Greece and Turkey is also unlikely to address the deep-seated causes of the political turmoil between Ankara and European allies, and NATO should find new and improved ways to act as a forum to discuss, and to act, where necessary, on issues affecting the security interests of its member states. This is key if the organization wants to remain flexible and relevant in the increasingly contested and fast-paced security environment of today.

#### Cooperation brings Turkey back into the NATO fold

Erdemir 12-3-2021, \*Turkey Program Board of Advisors, \*\*Sinan Ciddi, Nonresident Senior Fellow, \*\*\*John Hardie, Research Manager and Senior Research Analyst (Aykan, Collusion or Collision?, FDD, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2021/12/03/collusion-or-collision/)//BB

Although Erdogan and Putin have found ways of cooperating, often at the expense of the United States and its allies and partners, Turkey’s and Russia’s respective interests and ambitions conflict or diverge on multiple fronts. Washington should seek to leverage these tensions to undermine Erdogan’s collusion with Putin and contain Moscow in the short run, while laying the groundwork to bring Ankara back into the NATO fold in the post-Erdogan era.

#### The aff’s strategic dialogue solves disputes with Turkey – shared values ensure the alliance will be repaired

**Beyoghlow ‘20** – adjunct professor of international security at the George Washington University’s Elliot School of International Affairs, where he teaches courses on Turkish politics and foreign policy (Kamal, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, “TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE BRINK: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO AND THE US-TURKISH STRATEGIC AND MILITARY PARTNERSHIP”, January 2020, <https://www-jstor-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/stable/pdf/resrep24340.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Af4722a403c137d09b5f6dc26ca56c20f&ab_segments=0%2FSYC-6442%2Ftest&origin=&acceptTC=1> )//RG

While the current standoff between Turkey and the United States appears to be moving from bad to worse, **it has yet to reach** a breaking point or a **point of no return.** Although tensions and policy differences continue to plague US-Turkish relations, efforts by well-meaning policymakers within the US government and Turkey’s civilian and military establishment **point to** perhaps **better days to come**, given the resilience and endurance of the **ties that bind the two nations together**. The US perspective on Turkey could be traced to many factors, starting with the refusal of the Turkish Parliament to allow US forces to transit Turkish territory to attack Iraq in 2003 and the slow Turkish support for the US-led coalition against ISIS. Turkey is also being put on notice by the United States for feuding against other NATO allies—namely, Germany, the Netherlands, Cyprus, France, and Greece. In the last case, tensions have been brewing in recent months over new border disputes in the Aegean and the refusal of Greece to extradite a group of Turkish officers allegedly involved in the failed coup. Although resolving the Cyprus issue remains high on the US agenda, tensions between Turkey and Cyprus over oil and gas exploration rights and access off the coast of Cyprus are forcing the United States and the European Union to side with Cyprus and even entertain sending US naval ships to protect Cypriot gas and oil tracks at sea. Despite these and other policy differences over Syria and other domestic problems facing Turkey, **both sides seem reluctant to cause irreparable damage to their alliance**. The United States, which has traditional ties with Turkey, does not want a military confrontation with the country over Syria. The most hopeful sign of addressing some of the protracted problems currently facing US-Turkish relations stems from the fact that Turkey is still seen by the United States as important to America’s national security interests, especially given Turkey’s geostrategic location and cultural familiarity with its volatile neighbors. Turkey is currently self-absorbed with its ambitions and Muslim neo-Ottoman nationalist revivalism, but its unique ballot-box democracy, albeit imperfect by Western standards, **will work toward increasing harmonization toward the U**nited **S**tates **and its NATO allies in the long run. This can only happen through a sustained strategic dialogue.** The idea is to keep Turkey and the United States engaged while trying to find solutions to the issues that separate them, because once the current tactical posturing is stripped away, the strategic alliance becomes more visible. There is indeed current evidence for better US-NATO-Turkish cross-cultural communication techniques to manage and resolve outstanding policy and strategic differences. In short, **Turkey is not yet lost**, but there are challenges facing America and its NATO partners in how to bridge the growing gap between them and Turkey. This challenge touches on a fundamental question: What kind of strategic relation- ship do the United States, NATO, and Turkey want or desire? Clearly, they are at a policy and strategic cross- road. The answer lies in the need for the United States to craft a new strategy toward Turkey and vice versa that takes into account the new realities of Turkish, NATO, and American domestic political dynamics, their changing nature and character, as well as Tur- key’s quest for regional influence and ambitions and its goal of becoming a great regional power. **Turkey, NATO, and the U**nited **S**tates **share Western values, and** **these values**, although not equal for all partners, **are keys to better multicultural harmony if applied properly** across the board.

#### Turkey is pursuing a parallel policy with NATO and will remain an active member of the alliance, despite differences

**Bechev ‘22** - nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is also a research fellow at the Center of Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the director of the European Policy Institute, a think-tank based in Sofia, Bulgaria (Dimitar, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, “A rival or an awkward partner? Turkey’s relationship with the West in the Balkans”, January 26, 2022, <https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/14683857.2021.2024988?needAccess=true> )//RG

Despite the considerable degree of divergence, Ankara acts in parallel but not necessarily against the EU and the United States. In the grand scheme of things, Turkey is tightly connected to the European economy, a fact highlighted by the ongoing recession, which puts at risk EU investors too. Turkish trade with EU members Romania, Greece and Bulgaria is by far more significant than with the Western Balkans, though Serbia is picking up too. On the security side, Turkey pursues a policy independently of NATO and has deepened ties to Russia. **Yet, it remains part of the Alliance and contributes to its initiatives, including those aimed to deter Moscow.** When it comes to the Balkans, Turkey has no alternative to offer to local countries to woo them away from Euro- Atlantic institutions. Its resources are limited, too, in comparison with the collective West. What is also important is that Balkan elites do not necessarily see a trade-off between ties to Western organizations and to Turkey. That is clearly visible in the policy of non-aligned Serbia, which has also been courting Russia, China and the Gulf while negotiating its membership in the EU. But it is also the case of Bulgaria which has emerged as a leading advocate of engagement with Turkey within the Union. The only country in Southeast Europe which has deep-seated concerns and fears about Turkish expansionism is Greece, which has long-standing territorial disputes with its neighbour only made worse by the looming conflict over offshore gas deposits in the proximity of Cyprus. But Greek policymakers have demonstrated the capacity to be flexible and deescalate tensions (Christofis in this issue). Turkey is embedded in the politics, economies and societies of the Balkans. It is an autonomous player, and the cult of Erdoğan has become central to its presence in the region, often with divisive effects. However, **there is no evidence that its actions or policies are geared at replacing the West** as the lynchpin of regional order. Rather, **Turkey is pursuing a parallel policy, which** at times **overlaps with that of the** EU, **US and NATO.**

#### US-Turkey relations can be repaired through multilateralism – neither want the instability of a hostile relationship

**Şahin and Sözen ‘22** - Devrim Şahin is a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science and International Relations as well as the research assistant in Cyprus Policy Center at Eastern Mediterranean University; Ahmet Sözen is professor of International Relations. He is the Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations as well as the Founding Director of the think tank Cyprus Policy Center at Eastern Mediterranean University (Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 74, “The Complexity Effect in U.S.-Turkey Relations”, March 8, 2022, <https://www-jstor-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/stable/pdf/27130874.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Abfa7c68f990faec529d87de41732c011&ab_segments=0%2FSYC-6442%2Ftest&origin=> )//RG

In the recent decade, the U.S. has pursued a strategy to support armed Kurdish groups to repel radical Islamic terror groups, particularly ISIS. Nevertheless, Turkey has become increasingly concerned about the strengthening of the Kurdish administration and its nationalist ambitions. These concerns are pushing Turkey into the arms of U.S. rivals in the region. Both Iran and Russia are expanding their authority in the region by establishing political and military support for radical regimes such as Assad’s in Syria and political and militant movements like Hezbollah. These strategic policies are increasingly connecting Iran’s and Russia’s allies in an ever-strengthening regional security complex. Given these regional circumstances, Turkey finds itself flip-flopping between these rival regional security complexes. The primary cause for current problems in U.S.-Turkey relations is not simply the recent actions of the two countries. The complex view of the IR system facilitates the understanding that the U.S.-Turkey relationship is shaped by the feedback loops generated under both regional and global circumstances. The complexity of the international system can trigger a dramatically different evolution of relations between U.S. and Turkey as a feedback (reaction) caused by the U.S. For example, the U.S. does not hesitate to use methods like arming the YPG, even if these methods hurt former allies such as Turkey. As a result, U.S.-Turkish relations continue to be vulnerable to the U.S. approach toward minority, rebel groups which have problematic bonds with Turkey. The international roles that the U.S. and Turkey pursued for themselves in the post-9/11 era have had consequences for perceptions of historical friendship or hostilities – what the Regional Security Complex Theory ties to cooperative or non-cooperative behavior of states. There were hostility perceptions among Turkish military and Foreign Service chiefs in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union when the U.S. sought to maintain its global supremacy role. Given its resources, the U.S. cannot help but be superior to smaller, poorer states that do not have Washington’s military capacity. The issue is the way in which the U.S. dominates – that is, its treatment of its allies, not considering their strategic security concerns, etc. Turkey was deeply concerned with events in northern Iraq following the 1991 Iraq war. These events amounted to challenge Turkey’s priority of preventing the emergence of an independent Kurdish administration in northern Iraq. The hostility perceptions in Turkey turned to be reciprocal between the U.S. and Turkey thanks to the feedback loops generated by the 9/11 attacks. The unilateral U.S. reaction to the 9/11 attacks during the Bush administration undermined the U.S.-led liberal international order and played no small role in the inauguration of Trump as a president who questions this order and views local U.S. allies as burdens on the U.S. If we acknowledge that the complexity of the international relations system is at play here, the causal logic of the complexity approach leads us to expect that Turkey’s internal characteristics can pressure systemic transformation – something other than the predictions generated by the regional security complex approach.83 A U.S. that operates with a systemic moral conscience could assist Turkey in managing its affairs. Facing complexity **invokes improving diplomacy and collaboration, adopting multilateral solutions** and soft power **and constructing** some **advanced strategic partnerships**. If the U.S. chooses to nurture its relationships with allies such as Turkey, the erosion of the U.S. position of influence could be mitigated and the U.S. still could be the primary actor in maintaining stability in the Middle East. The underlying message of this paper is that **the U.S. and Turkey are rebuilding their alliance due to various factors.** Both **countries could form a revised alliance as an important constituent of the regional peace system.** Neither of them desires the continuation of the Syrian chaotic status-quo and its accompanying insecurity nor do they desire Iran to dominate with a greater role in Syria or in the Middle East. Clearly, the security of the region is in a state of greater flux today than it has been in the past, yet **tackling the present challenges** in the Middle East **depends on the effective involvement of regional U.S. partners.**

#### Turkey is shifting its foreign policy towards diplomacy – US reciprocation will facilitate it

**Ülgen ‘22** - Visiting Scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels and the Executive Chairman of the Istanbul based EDAM think tank (Sinan, Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development, No. 20, “Change and Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy”, Winter 2022, <https://www-jstor-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/stable/pdf/48651513.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ad0a1c2bdb5f23228945a2518163cea7a&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_phrase_search%2Fcontrol&origin=&acceptTC=1> )//RG

The end result of Turkey’s tarnished ties with its traditional allies in the West and its neighborhood(s) have demonstrated the limits of the illusion of Ankara’s strategic autonomy. Indeed, despite its aspiration, **Turkey remains firmly anchored in the Western community of nations.** In addition to being a NATO member, over 40 percent of the country’s exports are destined for EU member states and another 6 percent or so each to the UK and the United States. In addition, Turkey gets most of its foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology from Western countries. EU member states account for almost 70 percent of all incoming FDI, with another nearly 10 per- cent accounted by the United States. Against this backdrop, the 2020 economic downturn, compounded by a sharp drop in FDI, a negative foreign investment balance sheet (excluding real estate), and a lowering of credit risk scores—and, more recently, a spike in inflation and a downturn in the value of the national currency—are to be associated with these frail political relations. The next phase of Turkey’s foreign relations paradigm will therefore be marked **by how well the country’s growing capabilities**—but also its ambitions—**can be reframed to allow for a more cooperative foreign policy** pattern. This objective will in turn require three fundamental changes. The first is the decoupling of foreign policy from domestic political considerations. A new balance will have to be found between the need for a democratic government that is accountable to its electorate and the need for a more mature and predictable foreign policy. This new understanding should be instrumental in containing the proclivities of the ruling elites to instrumentalize foreign policy for domestic goals. This objective will be greatly facilitated by a second, namely the reinstitutionalization of foreign policy. As discussed above, the transition back to a presidential system has led to the erosion of the role of traditional institutions (e.g., ministries) in the policymaking process—to the benefit of the presidential administration. This is also true of foreign policy, where the role of the Foreign Ministry has been diminished. This domain requires re- balancing, which would reempower the traditional institution of policymaking. Such a rebalancing would improve the predictability of Turkey’s foreign policy, as the heavier weight of the relevant institutions could more effectively counter the tendencies fueled by exclusively domestic political considerations. Third, the country’s foreign policy retransformation will be more effective if Turkey’s partners respond positively to such an agenda of change. The United States and the EU—Turkey’s strategic allies in the domains of security, defense, and economy—can help Ankara in its bid to develop a new understanding of how Turkey, as a rising power, can prioritize positive sum scenarios. For instance, **Washington will need to** alter its approach and **start to engage constructively with the Turkish leadership to tackle** the corrosive set of **bilateral problems,** including the ongoing U.S. relationship with the PKK-linked Syrian PYD and the dysfunctionalities in defense industry cooperation. At the same time, the EU will need—at the very least—to cease its obstructionism regarding the launch of an ambitious trade agenda and endorse the start of the negotiations for a modernized Customs Union between Turkey and the EU. The outcome of new negotiations to reach a fair and lasting model of cooperation on the refugee issue will be of equal importance. At bottom, what is at stake in the next decade is the identity of Turkish foreign policy. **A departure from** what marked the past decade—**unilateralism** inspired by a strong yearning for strategic autonomy—**is already under way**. **This change in approach is evident in** the more **recent efforts at diplomatic rapprochement with allies and regional partners**. Ultimately, the success of this transformation will be conditional on a clear demonstration of intent by the country’s leadership that **Turkey**, as a rising power, **needs to establish a more constructive and cooperative relationship with its main allies.**

### NATO-Turkey Coop Good---AT Spoiler

#### Turkey isn’t a terminal spoiler --- there are avenues for cooperation [like the plan]

Bechev 22, PhD, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is also a research fellow at the Center of Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the director of the European Policy Institute, a think-tank based in Sofia, Bulgaria. (Dimitar, “A rival or an awkward partner? Turkey’s relationship with the West in the Balkans,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 22.1)//BB

Turkey as an awkward partner

Despite the rift between Turkey and the West, Ankara’s Balkan policy is neither disruptive nor entirely beholden to neo-imperialist fantasies. Rather it reflects a mixture of ideology and pragmatic calculations and is often a product of circumstances rather than grand designs. To start with, there is no evidence that Erdogan or the AKP are systematically exporting authoritarian institutions and practices abroad, undermining the West. Authoritarianism in the Balkans is a home-grown phenomenon and not an import. In the 1990s, for instance, both Serbia and Croatia saw the emergence of strongman regimes led respectively by Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tudjman. Such regimes combined democratic and authoritarian elements, e.g. competitive elections in tandem with state capture skewing the playing field, the propagation of illiberal ideology and the suppression of minorities. It would be far-fetched to fault Erdoğan, Putin, Viktor Orbán or anyone else about the rule of law and accountability deficits in a region with historical experience with competitive politics but is still a novice when it comes to democratic governance. External powers may take advantage of state capture and corruption, as they often do, but these are by and large local conditions liable to be exploited (Bechev 2017; Bieber and Tzifakis 2019). Foreign meddling could well exacerbate matters – e.g. Turkey’s partnership with or outright patronage over certain politicians and factions in Bosnia and Herzegovina consolidates their grip on power and public resources – but is not the root cause of democratic dysfunctionality. Secondly, Turkey is not always the lone wolf it appears to be. A ‘neo-Ottoman’ policy would imply that Turkey acts mostly unilaterally instead of through institutions or alliances such as NATO. To be sure, Turkish foreign policy has a strong unilateralist impulse, as many scholars and experts have pointed out. Self-reliance and distrust of foreigners are entrenched in the Turkish public’s perceptions and attitudes (Aydın 2019). Ankara has made moves and asserted its interests in the Balkans, such as providing economic assistance through TİKA), supporting domestic political players aligned with the AKP, funding schools, trying to mediate in regional disputes etc. The same was very much true of the Middle East before the Arab Spring when Davutoğlu was touting the notion of Turkey as an order-setter (düzen kurucu ülke) (Davutoğlu 2001). At the same time, even with President Erdoğan in complete control and nationalism rampant, foreign policy has played along and adapted to multilateral institutions. To give the obvious example, despite its strained relationship with NATO and the EU, Ankara continues to support their enlargement to the Balkans, as in the AKP’s early years of power. Rather than pursue an obstructionist strategy, as does Russia, and try to wean countries into its diplomatic orbit, it ratified without delay Montenegro and North Macedonia’s NATO accession treaty. There is no rhetorical or substantive opposition from Ankara vis-à-vis the EU’s expansion (Daily Sabah 2020). That makes sense from a purely rational perspective. Bringing new members also means expanded market access for Turkey thanks to the Customs Union with the EU. Notably, Turkey is amongst the top five export markets for Romania, Bulgaria and Greece, all members of the Union.7 In short, there still remains a multilateral dimension to Turkey’s engagement with the Balkans, even if it gets overshadowed by Erdoğan’s leader-to-leader diplomacy (Büyük and Öztürk 2019). To sum up, despite the overarching trends towards de-Europeanization affecting both Turkey and the Balkans, there remains institutional ties and economic ties that bind them both in the Western sphere. This creates space for Turkey and Western actors to join forces in the region on an ad hoc basis.

#### They aren’t a terminal spoiler. There’s room for cooperation.

Bechev 22, PhD, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is also a research fellow at the Center of Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the director of the European Policy Institute, a think-tank based in Sofia, Bulgaria. (Dimitar, “A rival or an awkward partner? Turkey’s relationship with the West in the Balkans,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 22.1)//BB

Turkey is embedded in the politics, economies and societies of the Balkans. It is an autonomous player, and the cult of Erdoğan has become central to its presence in the region, often with divisive effects. However, there is no evidence that its actions or policies are geared at replacing the West as the lynchpin of regional order. Rather, Turkey is pursuing a parallel policy, which at times overlaps with that of the EU, US and NATO.

### NATO-Turkey Coop Good---AT S-400’s

#### Turkey only bought S-400s from russia because there was no US agreement on modalities

Pamir et al 20-- Ahmet Üzümcü- Former Director-General of the OPCW, Former Permanent Representative of Turkey to NATO, Mehmet Fatih Ceylan- Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, 2013-2018, Ümit Pamir- Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, 2004-2006 (“Turkey and NATO: resolving the S-400 spat,” European leadership network, 16 December 2020, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/turkey-and-nato-resolving-the-s-400-spat/)//mcu

Bashing Turkey in international fora has become fashionable. Some suggest that Turkey is no longer a reliable or trustworthy member of NATO. Some go further, claiming that Turkey is a liability, ignoring its history as a staunch ally. As former Turkish Ambassadors to NATO, we believe that a healthy dose of reality should be injected into this debate, which risks descending into a blame game in which only NATO’s opponents stand to gain. For the good of NATO and Turkey we offer some constructive proposals and perspectives to restore a sense of balance. First, we should seek to understand and resolve the one issue overshadowing all else, the Turkish purchase of Russian made S-400 air defence systems and the U.S. decision to both disengage Turkey from the F35 programme and to place some sanctions on it. It should be remembered that Turkey wanted to buy US air defence systems but there was no agreement on the modalities. Nevertheless, this impasse in bilateral relations between Turkey and the U.S., and therefore within the Alliance, must and can be overcome with a modicum of give-and-take on both sides. In our opinion, the issue of the Russian-made S-400s could be satisfactorily resolved if Turkey makes a verifiable pledge within NATO not to activate the system and the U.S. takes a decision in parallel to reverse its position on the exclusion of Turkey from the F35 programme and on the recently imposed sanctions. Such conciliatory moves should be complemented by a decision, backed by Alliance solidarity, to enable Turkey to reach a deal on the joint production of a missile defence system under a generous technology sharing agreement. We firmly believe that such a compromise is achievable.

### NATO-Turkey Coop Good---AT Russia

#### Turkey and Russia engage in conflict over cooperation.

Antoine Got 20. Fellow, Geneva Center for Security Policy. M.A., International Relations, University of Edinburgh. "Turkey’s Crisis with the West: How a New Low in Relations Risks Paralyzing NATO." War on the Rocks. 11-19-2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/turkeys-crisis-with-the-west-how-a-new-low-in-relations-risks-paralyzing-nato/. accessed 6-20-2022 //ART

Ultimately, however, fears of a Turkish realignment with Russia are likely overblown. Moscow and Ankara’s relations have historically been fraught, and the recent rapprochement stems more from opportunism and coinciding interests than a major reorientation in Turkish foreign policy at the expense of its traditional alliances. In fact, Turkey’s forceful posturing is making it steadily more at odds with Russia in conflict environments where both operate, including Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, and Libya. Its growing involvement in the Caucasus, for instance, has brought it dangerously close to armed confrontation with NATO’s primary contestant, Russia, which supports Armenia under the Collective Security Treaty Organization framework. This was highlighted by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s underscoring of Russia’s “obligations to Armenia.” Though the violence ended there, Turkey’s proxy saber-rattling contributes to increase risks of accident or miscalculation leading to armed confrontation with Russia — something all parties are eager to avoid. With antagonistic security interests at stake, Turkey and Russia are ultimately more likely to balance against rather than align with each other, though several NATO allies continue to regard Ankara’s ties to Moscow with a deep-seated sense of suspicion.

### AT Expulsion---No Link

#### Turkey chooses NATO first.

Yaprak Gürsoy and Ilke Toygür 18. Yaprak, Lecturer, Aston University. Ilke, Adjunct Professor, Carlos III University of Madrid. “Turkey in and out of NATO? An instance of a turbulent alliance with Western institutions." Elcano Royal Institute. 6-11-2018. https://media.realinstitutoelcano.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ari73-2018-gursoy-toygur-turkey-in-out-nato-turbulent-alliance-western-institutions.pdf. accessed 6-20-2022 //ART

What does Turkey expect from its cooperation with Russia? First and foremost, it has a bargaining chip to be used against its Western partners. This type of flirtation threatens the alliance and forces the NATO powers to support Turkey’s agenda in Syria. However, Turkey is aware that Russia is an unreliable partner and that in the long-run it is no benefit to be outside NATO. That is why, for instance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs declarations continue to stress Turkey’s place in NATO and why Turkey continues to support its NATO allies’ air strikes against Damascus. It seems that if Turkey is pressed to decide between NATO and Russia, it will continue to choose NATO.

#### Turkey would never alienate NATO.

Dr. Mehmet Yegin 19. Assistant Professor, Istinye University. "Turkey between NATO and Russia: the failed balance: Turkey's S-400 purchase and implications for Turkish relations with NATO." German Institute for International and Security Affairs. https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/63534/ssoar-2019-yegin-Turkey\_between\_NATO\_and\_Russia.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2019-yegin-Turkey\_between\_NATO\_and\_Russia.pdf. accessed 6-20-2022 //ART

In terms of alliance dependence, Turkey would not put the peace and deterrence provided by NATO at risk in a volatile neighborhood. This approach includes Russia-originated threats. Despite conjunctural cooperation between Turkey and Russia, the chances for a new strategic axis centered on the two countries is improbable. Rather, NATO is an important asset for Turkey, even in developing its relations with Russia, as membership eases the threat of domination by Moscow. As a NATO member, Turkey can rely on deterrence that discourages regional adversaries from engaging in a full-scale military campaign against Turkey. This deterrence is no less important than having particular weapons, such as S-400s. NATO also supports inter-alliance peace between Turkey and Greece, thereby sustaining a delicate balance to prevent the Aegean dispute from turning into a military confrontation. Turkey has a long-term policy of participating in the international organizations that Greece joins in order to maintain parity. Leaving the most crucial one – NATO – would put Turkey in the difficult position of confronting the alliance alone. Lastly, Turkey would not want to give up the NATO nuclear umbrella, given that some of its neighbors possess (Russia) or are striving for the capability of developing (Iran) nuclear weapons.

#### Turkey won’t leave

Synergia Foundation 19 (NATO AND TURKEY: AN IMMINENT DIVORCE?, https://www.synergiafoundation.org/insights/analyses-assessments/nato-and-turkey-imminent-divorce)

Stung by the continued rejection of its EU membership on grounds of its “poor human rights record”, the authoritarian Erdogan just does not have the incentive to toe NATO line.

Suspension of GSP benefits and increasing pressure from the Senate to impose sanctions on Turkey under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) will only widen the gap between Turkey and NATO.

However, Turkey is unlikely to unilaterally opt out of the alliance because the alliance does have many benefits apart from the prestige of being a member of NATO.

Hardening of the Turkish stand will impinge on conflict resolution in Syria where Turkish national goals are at a tangent to Western plans. Here, Turkey may leverage Russia to checkmate US and its allies.

#### Turkey won’t leave NATO or respond to the plan

TASS 5-30 (TASS, 30 MAY 2022, “Turkey will not leave NATO, but press for its interests — expert,” <https://tass.com/world/1458067?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com>; accessed 6/23/2022) ng

MOSCOW, May 30. /TASS/. Turkey will continue to pursue an independent military policy, but will refrain from "challenging" the United States or quitting the North Atlantic alliance, the head of the Russian International Affairs Council, Andrey Kortunov, told TASS on Monday. "Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, while being a full-fledged member of the North Atlantic Alliance, pursues an independent, externally unrestrained military policy. The way I see it, he will continue like this this further on," Kortunov said. Erdogan "firmly defends his interests, for he is well aware that Turkey will not be expelled from NATO, while he will not leave on his own," the analyst said. At the same time, Kortunov predicts Ankara’s conflicts with NATO. "There will be harsh statements and threats from both sides, but I don't think it will come to Turkey's withdrawal or expulsion from NATO. It would cost both sides too much." Turkey’s interests Without Turkey, Kortunov explained, "NATO's southern flank will lose a lot, if not everything," since the country is the bloc’s leading member and its armed forces are inferior only to those of the US. For this reason, he continued, the Turkish leadership will be pressing for concessions from the US and EU countries, "but it will never challenge them." Erdogan has a whole list of complaints against the United States, Kortunov recalled. For instance, Turkey wants the lifting sanctions related to its purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense systems and its return to the US F-35 fighter program. "There is as great deal to bargain about. Clearly, Erdogan will not get everything, but he will be able to get something in the end," he believes. The expert also suggested that the Turkish side might be able to defend its interests on the issue of Finland and Sweden joining NATO. For one, the Turkish leadership wants these countries to curtail their traditional support for the Kurdish opposition. "I think they will eventually come to an agreement. Here, concessions are expected not only from Stockholm, but also from Brussels," Kortunov explained. While commenting on the Turkish leader's contacts with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the expert noted: "In the alliance, no one would want Erdogan to play his own game with Moscow behind its back. But it be impossible to prevent it, so they will have to leave everything as it is." The analyst stressed that Turkey had long had a very special relationship with the North Atlantic Alliance and declared certain interests that often do not coincide with the stance of other NATO members. The Turkish leadership, Kortunov forecasts, will continue to pursue a policy that, in a sense, might violate the unity of the bloc. "However, in this regard, Erdogan will go as far as he will be allowed to," he stressed. "He will be declaring his special interests in Libya or the Eastern Mediterranean, he will put himself in opposition to some European countries, or position himself as a global advocate of Islam, but I don't think he will go to extremes."

### Expulsion Bad---L-List

#### Turkish inclusion into NATO solves Russia, Middle Eastern and Caucasus war

Hess 6-22-2022, Central Asia fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (Maximillian, “Why the West Should Make Peace With Erdogan Now: He is the one unsavory character the West urgently needs better relations with.,” Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/22/turkey-erdogan-ukraine-russia-war-west-us-geopolitics-black-sea-europe-energy/?tpcc=recirc_latest062921)//BB>

The democratic West has a long and controversial history of entering alliances of convenience with dictators and strongmen around the world—unsavory but necessary partners in confronting threats to the international order. Denounced as ethically dubious, this sort of stance is also realist, balance-of-power politics par excellence. It enabled the world to unite to defeat Adolf Hitler in World War II and the West to win the Cold War. Atop the list of unsavory partners the West urgently needs better relations with today sits Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. That he is unsavory is clear: He has actively undermined Turkish democracy, undone decades of liberalization, weaponized migration, terrorized the Kurdish minority both at home and in neighboring Syria, and helped Iran violate U.S. sanctions. Most recently, he has threatened to block NATO membership for Sweden and Finland. It will take a long time before the West can genuinely trust him. However, the reality is that the West needs Erdogan more than ever. Russia’s brutal, all-out war against Ukraine has vastly raised Turkey’s profile on the geostrategic chessboard. Ankara has emerged as a key supplier of drones to Kyiv—shipments it has luckily shown no intention of halting. Ukraine’s chances of victory would be significantly improved if Turkish arms deliveries were expanded. Erdogan, who controls access to the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits, crucially shut the passage to warships in late February. At the same time, Ankara has also been willing to cooperate with Moscow on Ukraine where Erdogan sees an opportunity. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu discussed plans to secure a route for Ukrainian grain exports with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, in Ankara on June 8, reportedly asking for a 25 percent discount on Turkish grain purchases as part of the deal. Without Ankara on board, any Western proposals to break the Russian blockade of Ukrainian ports are dead on arrival. The West also needs Turkey on its side in the economic war against Russia. Ankara’s support alone can restrict the flow of sanctioned Russian goods in and out of the Black Sea, which continue even as Ukrainian ships are stuck in port. Ankara’s help is crucial in cutting ratlines for Russian money and kleptocrats. Turkey has become a major destination for Russian money (and oligarchs’ yachts) fleeing sanctions and plays a growing role in supporting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s new autarkic economy. Turkey is one of the few major countries that freely accept Russian payment, undercutting the impact of Western banking sanctions. Bringing Turkey onboard would plug one of the largest holes in the sanctions regime. Russia’s brutal, all-out war against Ukraine has vastly raised Turkey’s profile on the geostrategic chessboard. But most importantly, Turkey will be a key player in the reordering of European energy supplies, not least because it controls energy access through a number of crucial pipelines. The key to Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor strategy, for example, is gas from Azerbaijan supplied via Turkey’s Trans-Anatolian and Trans-Adriatic pipelines—inaugurated in 2018 and 2020, respectively—and feeding into the European gas grid in the Balkans and Italy. Erdogan is also actively seeking to develop Turkey’s own gas resources and potentially even link Israeli and Cypriot offshore gas fields to the European pipeline network. Such efforts are of course complicated by Greco-Turkish disputes over Cyprus and its surrounding waters. A revived European-Turkish partnership may be the only way the Eastern Mediterranean’s rich energy resources can be fully utilized. Such a partnership might also nudge Erdogan to make an about-face vis-à-vis Russia, where the inauguration of the TurkStream pipeline in 2020 signaled a new high point in Turkish-Russian relations. Finally, aligning with Erdogan would offer the West more geostrategic leverage over the Kremlin beyond the war in Ukraine. Turkey is also a key player in three additional conflicts where Russia is involved: Syria, Libya, and the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Erdogan moved from a policy of benign neglect to active intervention in these conflicts over the past decade, motivated by a desire to boost Turkey’s role as a regional power independent of the West. A resumed partnership with Erdogan offers further pressure points in the effort to constrain Moscow’s global influence. For Erdogan’s drift away from the West and closer relations with Moscow to be reversed, it is important to understand what motivated it. Today, the West is paying a price for failing to listen to his concerns. The drift initially began in 2011, as the Arab Spring swept across North Africa and the Middle East. Erdogan was ebullient, as the uprisings offered the prospect of bringing Islamists similar to himself to power across the region. He felt betrayed when then-U.S. President Barack Obama failed to uphold his redlines in Syria and abandoned then-Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and publicly backed by Erdogan, when the Egyptian military ousted Morsi in a coup. “Turkey has learned the hard way that the U.S. is unwilling to invest in the region,” Muhammet Kocak, an international relations specialist based in Ankara, told me. Similarly, “Turkey’s security concerns have not been perceived as a particularly relevant issue in the NATO agenda,” said Elizabete Aunina, a doctoral researcher at the University of Amsterdam focused on Turkish security policy. But what accelerated Erdogan’s drift away from the West—and shift to Moscow—was his sense of betrayal after the 2016 failed Turkish coup, which he publicly accused the United States of fostering. He also felt abandoned by his NATO allies when Washington withdrew its Patriot missile defense systems from Turkey and when NATO barely even reacted after Turkey shot down a Russian fighter aircraft intruding on its airspace, the first such incident involving NATO and Russian or Soviet airpower in 60 years. Since then, Erdogan felt that Moscow offered a better route to improving his regional and domestic position. Turkish-Russian cooperation since then includes the TurkStream pipeline, plans for Russia to build a $20 billion nuclear power plant in Turkey, and the 2017 announcement that Ankara would buy Moscow’s S-400 missile defense system. And although Turkey and Russia have occasionally sparred—they back differing sides in the Syrian and Libyan civil wars, for example—relations have remained broadly warm and manageable. That only increases the potential strategic leverage the West would gain if it reversed Erdogan’s orientation. What carrot could the West offer Erdogan for abandoning Moscow? Turkey’s economic crisis may be just the opportunity. With annual inflation reaching 73.5 percent in May, currency reserves near all-time lows, and the Turkish lira down by 30 percent versus the dollar year-to-date following a 44 percent drop in 2021, Turkey’s risk of default has spiked. Foreign investors have fled the market. Desperately searching for fresh foreign capital, Erdogan even patched up relations with his key regional rival, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. It would be better for the West to offer Erdogan an economic lifeline than to allow Moscow to do so. The U.S. Federal Reserve and European Central Bank, for example, should consider offering Erdogan a currency swap line, a stabilizing instrument they have significantly expanded in recent decades. Access to dollars and euros could alleviate many of Ankara’s mounting economic challenges and set the stage for a more cooperative partnership. Erdogan knows he has a strong hand and is likely to make other demands. He has already exerted his leverage over Sweden’s and Finland’s desired accession to NATO, linking it to a freer hand for Turkey against the Syrian Kurds, who have been the West’s valiant allies in the fight against the Islamic State. Earlier this month, Erdogan announced plans for a new operation targeting them. He may well make demands about other regional interests, and he will certainly seek to blunt Western criticism of his domestic governance. These concessions could prove costly to other Western interests. There is clear hesitancy to engage Erdogan at the moment. The West’s strategy appears to be to “count on the possibility Erdogan will lose the [June 2023] elections,” according to Kocak. Counting on Erdogan to allow a free and fair election and a potential peaceful transfer of power a year from now is idealistic at best and hopelessly naive at worst. Erdogan is an unsavory character and will likely remain one. But it is in the West’s interest that he be on its side—not Russia’s—in order to weaken Putin and ensure Ukraine’s survival. The opportunity is there, and it would be unwise of the West not to try.

### Expulsion Bad---Turkish Aggression

#### Turkey expulsion collapse Black Sea deterrence, sparks Greece-Turkey war, and creates a European refugee crisis.

Peter Pry 19, chief of staff of the Congressional EMP Commission and served on the staff of the House Armed Services Committee and at the CIA, “Expelling Turkey from NATO would create a dangerous foe”, TheHill,10-23-2019, <https://thehill.com/opinion/international/466747-expelling-turkey-from-nato-would-create-a-dangerous-foe///SJ>

Some analysts evaluate Turkey as among the most militarily powerful nations, ranking ninth among 137 military powers worldwide.

Do we really want to kick Turkey out of NATO and have its military power and strategic geography aligned with Russia?

Geographically, Turkey occupies some of the most strategically important territory in the world. It is the only NATO member state in the Middle East, bordering Syria and Iraq, near Lebanon and Israel, a region that has been — and continues to be — the crucial crossroads of empire and history since biblical times. Turkey controls the Bosporus Straits, Marmara Sea and Dardanelles Straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, giving it the capability to contain Russia’s powerful Black Sea Fleet. Turkey’s geographic location and strong military makes it the anchor of NATO’s southern flank against Russian aggression.

Turkey also is an unsinkable aircraft carrier, with 98 airports capable of supporting NATO air operations over the Middle East, Black Sea and the Balkans.

It is one of only five NATO states (the others being Germany, Italy, Belgium and The Netherlands) storing U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on its territory. Some 50 B-61 nuclear bombs are bunkered at Incirlik Air Force Base, controlled by U.S. personnel stationed there.

Washington’s foreign policy elites are so fixated on recent Kurdish contributions to defeating the Islamic State (ISIS) that they seem to have forgotten Turkey’s much longer record as an ally of the U.S. and NATO:

* Turkey fought alongside the U.S. during the Korean War (1950-1953).
* During the early Cold War, Turkey agreed to basing U.S. nuclear bombers and IRBMs on its territory, making Turkey a nuclear target for the USSR. (President Kennedy was able to avoid nuclear war with the Soviet Union and resolve the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis by secretly promising Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to remove the U.S. IRBMs.)
* Turkey joined the U.S. and NATO in bombing Bosnia during Operation Deliberate Force (1995).
* Turkey joined the U.S. and NATO in bombing Serbia during Operation Allied Force (1999).
* Turkey participated in Baltic Sea air patrols demonstrating support for the NATO Baltic states (2006).
* For years and continuing today, Turkish forces have participated in NATO peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo.
* Turkey provided military and intelligence support to U.S. operations that destroyed the ISIS terrorist “caliphate.”

Turkey’s membership in NATO quelled the long cycle of conflicts and wars with Greece, also a NATO member. Significantly, even Turkey’s controversial invasion of Cyprus in 1974 did not trigger a war with Greece, in no small part because both are NATO members.

Unfortunately, Turkey under President Erdogan is abandoning secularism and democratic norms, becoming an Islamist authoritarian state, and pulling away from the U.S. and NATO. Indeed, Erdogan is beginning to align Turkey with Russia, buying Russian military equipment over U.S. objections.

Erdogan even has threatened to develop nuclear weapons, which justifies withdrawing U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Turkey. Yet Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel and other Middle East allies all have legitimate fear of Iran developing nuclear missiles, so threatened nuclear proliferation by Turkey and others may be a sign of U.S. failure to uphold its alliance obligations through credible extended nuclear deterrence and other means.

Turkey controls the flow of Middle Eastern refugees into European NATO, a crucial role whereby a friendly Turkey can help stabilize its neighbors — or an unfriendly Turkey could unleash a human flood into Europe.

Israel, too, will be better served if Turkey remains in NATO and, thus, a moderating influence on Islamist Erdogan, who eventually may be replaced by a secular leader. Imagine the threat to U.S. and Israeli interests if Turkey leaves NATO and becomes another Islamist rogue state like Iran.

Turkey’s withdrawal from NATO may, or may not, be historically inevitable. But the United States should do everything possible to keep such a valuable ally in NATO and prevent Turkey from becoming a dangerous foe.

### Expulsion Bad---NATO

#### NATO needs turkey—acts as a peace bridge to the middle east, Muslim majority, and decisive ally versu China and Russia

**Oguzlu** 15- Associate Prof. Dr. in the Department of International Relations at Bilkent University. He holds a Ph.D. degree in IR, taken from Bilkent University in 2003. He holds a Master of Science degree in IR, taken from the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2000 and another Master of Arts degree in IR taken from Bilkent University in 1998 (Tarik Oguzlu, “TURKEY’S NATO MEMBERSHIP IS AN ASSET FOR BOTH TURKEY AND THE ALLIANCE,” https://www.turkheritage.org/en/publications/analysis-by-tho-contributors-and-liaisons/turkeys-nato-membership-is-an-asset-for-both-turkey-and-the-alliance-9620)//mcu

Just as Turkey derives immense benefits from NATO membership, the alliance in general and the United States in particular also benefit from Turkey's membership. First, since its entry to the alliance Turkey has played a key role in European security by shielding the continent from the east and the south. Turkey does not only act as a buffer zone insulating the Kantian Europe from the Hobbesian Middle East but also as a spearhead enabling NATO allies to reach out to the Caucasus, Black Sea, Central Asia and wider Middle East. During the Cold War Turkey acted as a bulwark against Soviet penetration into the wider Middle East and helped lessen the Soviet military pressure on central Europe by tying up sizable Soviet troops. Turkey's role as an unsinkable aircraft carrier has been well noted. Second, Turkey is the only ally within NATO which has a Muslim-majority population. Turkey's membership serves as an antidote to the claims that NATO is an alliance of Christian nations. This has become more and more important in the post-9/11 era, as civilizational and identity-related considerations have increasingly colored international politics. For NATO's military operations across the globe not to be seen as biased against Islamic nations, Turkey's presence inside the alliance has been vitally important. Third, if the Biden administration is sincere about revitalizing the rules-based international order and committed to strengthening NATO as a bulwark against Russia and China, securing Turkey’s cooperation within NATO would be decisive. Turkey is too important an ally to lose to the Russian-Chinese axis. Fourth, as NATO's current Secretary General has underlined many times, Turkey's cooperation within NATO has been vital to the defeat of radical religious terrorism in the wider Middle East. Besides, Turkey is home to millions of refugees who would like to otherwise go to European countries. Fifth, having the second largest army within the alliance and participated in almost all NATO military operations to date, Turkey has decisively contributed to NATO's overall military capabilities. Turkey's participation in multinational NATO operations in Afghanistan and taking command of it numerous times speak volumes in this regard. Turkey hosting the upcoming negotiations between the Afghan government and Taliban could potentially facilitate the peace process. Sixth, Turkey's membership in NATO provides western countries with important opportunities to have an influence on Turkey's international and internal policies/orientation as well. Why to lose this prerogative by pushing Turkey further away from the alliance? All in all, both Turkey and NATO allies gain from Turkey’s membership. Unless NATO turns out to become an ideological weapon at the hands of the liberal hawkish cabals in the West, Turkey would feel quite comfortable within the alliance.

#### Expulsion of turkey weakens NATO—increased antagonism, influence, loss of second largest military and Incirlik Air Base

Blaha 19- graduated from the University of Michigan School of Education in 2012. Prior to law school, he served as a Logistics Officer in the United States Army (JONATHAN BLAHA, “Married for Life? Can and should NATO divorce itself from Turkey?,” MJIL, <http://www.mjilonline.org/married-for-life-can-and-should-nato-divorce-itself-from-turkey/>)//mcu

While NATO may ultimately be able to expel Turkey, it would not be in NATO’s best interest to do so. First, the expulsion of Turkey could lead to increased antagonism between Turkey and NATO. Second, the loss of Turkey’s military contributions would be a significant loss to the alliance. Turkey’s 1974 invasion of Cyprus placed it in conflict with fellow NATO member Greece.[23] While NATO membership did not prevent the conflict, in part because Cyprus was not a member of NATO, Cyprus has maintained an uneasy peace since the invasion, managing to accede to the European Union in May of 2004.[24] An unaligned Turkey may be more likely to disrupt the peace in Cyprus, which is not a NATO member and may not be defended by the international community. The preserved peace in Cyprus, and the value of the NATO forum for preserving that peace, may be instructive for influencing potential future actions by Turkey. While the results of Turkey’s incursion into Kurdish controlled parts of Syria are currently unknown, NATO is more likely to influence Turkey as a member than a non-member potentially allied with Russia. Additionally, a loss of Turkey’s military contributions to NATO would significantly weaken the alliance. Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base serves a critical role in NATO operations. At the peak of the fighting, missions from the base dropped an average of 180 bombs per day.[25] Turkey is the geographically nearest member to Syria and Russia, as well as the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan,[26] and a loss of the base would hamper NATO operations in the region. NATO has invested over $5,000,000,000 on infrastructure in Turkey.[27] The importance of Incirlik Air Base to NATO was affirmed by the inclusion of $48,000,000 for its improvement in the National Defense Authorization Act for the fiscal year 2018.[28] In addition to its strategically vital location, Turkey’s military contributions to the alliance would be missed. Turkey has the second-largest military in NATO, larger than the third and fourth largest militaries combined,[29] as well as the seventh-highest defense expenditures.[30] Turkey has been part of the NATO mission in Afghanistan since 2001 and may have advantages in peace brokering due to shared Islamic religion.[31] There are clear benefits to maintaining Turkey’s membership and this course of action has advocates.[32] However, the question of membership may not matter. The United States is considering removing nuclear weapons from Turkey .[33] This would signal that NATO does not trust Turkey, making it a member in name only, and one unaligned with the rest of NATO, making the question of membership strategically irrelevant.

#### Nukes in İncirlik are key to NATO nuclear defense

Ergin 21- B.A. degree in international relations from Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University, Ergin has been active in journalism since 1975 when he began to work for Turkish News Agency as a general assignment reporter. He served as diplomatic reporter at daily Cumhuriyet’s Ankara office from 1979 to 1987. (Sedat Ergin, “What Biden said about nuclear weapons at İncirlik base and what he can do,” Daily News, May 06 2021, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/sedat-ergin/what-biden-said-about-nuclear-weapons-at-incirlik-base-and-what-he-can-do-164487)//mcu

İncirlik’s place on NATO’s nuclear deterrence In other words, when Biden was entering the presidential run of 2020, he started out stating his discomfort regarding the nuclear weapons in Turkey. The person who has expressed such worry is currently sitting at the White House. Can these statements of Biden reflect on the policies he will follow during his presidency? Let’s try to answer this question by examining the moves Biden has made on foreign policy. Biden sees strengthening transatlantic ties, that is, relations between the U.S. and Europe, and institutional cooperation structures as one of his primary foreign policy goals. In this context, NATO appears as the most strategic institution for the U.S. president. His strategy against Russia, which NATO continues to see as the main threat, is to protect nuclear deterrence, as reflected in all relevant documents of the alliance. In this context, we can remember the decisions of the NATO summit in Brussels in 2018. According to these, NATO’s nuclear deterrence is based on “the nuclear weapons deployed by the U.S. in the allied countries in Europe and the capabilities and infrastructure provided by the relevant allied countries” - as well as the contributions of the U.S. strategic forces and the U.K. and France. One of the “relevant allied countries” is Turkey. Without a doubt, İncirlik has a very essential place in the infrastructure provided to the U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. By allowing the possession of U.S. nuclear weapons in İncirlik and becoming the host to these weapons, Turkey has assumed a significant role in NATO’s nuclear deterrence. In this respect, İncirlik forms one of the most critical pillars of NATO’s nuclear umbrella under current conditions. Of course, the proximity of this base to not only Russia but also to the Middle East is undoubtedly a factor that needs to be taken into account. Biden will continue the old policy but… Given that İncirlik is so heavily integrated into NATO’s nuclear planning, it seems unrealistic to expect Biden’s sentiment in his interview with New York Times to be reflected in the U.S. official policy - unless there arises a major policy change. Next month, the NATO summit in Brussels, where Erdoğan and Biden will meet face to face for the first time in the new period, will probably be finalized with a result that will emphasize NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy once again. Nevertheless, if the Turkish-U.S. relations do not enter a period of recovery and continue to be the scene of crises as they are today, the possibility of further strengthening of the questioning view of the U.S. press, opinion leaders and the U.S. public opinion regarding the nuclear inventory in İncirlik should not be underestimated.

### Expulsion Bad---Prolif

#### Kicking Turkey out causes fast prolif

F Stephen Larabee 13, PhD in Political Science, holds the Distinguished Chair in European Security at the RAND Corporation, served as vice president and director of studies of the Institute of East–West Security Studies in New York, “Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East”, RAND, 2013, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\_reports/RR200/RR258/RAND\_RR258.sum.pdf//SJ

Turkey’s approach to the nuclear issue will heavily depend on U.S. policy and the credibility of the commitment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members to Article V of the Washington Treaty on collective defense. As long as Turkey feels that NATO takes seriously Turkish security concerns, Ankara is unlikely to rethink its nuclear policy. However, if Turkish confidence in the U.S. and NATO commitment to its security weakens, Ankara could begin to explore other options for ensuring its security, including the possible acquisition of its own nuclear deterrent. Thus, maintaining the credibility of the commitment of alliance members to Article V remains critical.

#### Regional arms racing and nuclear war

Adam Garfinkle 18, Founding Editor of The American Interest and a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “The U.S.-Turkish Unraveling and the Arabs”, American Interest, 09-03-2018, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/09/03/the-u-s-turkish-unraveling-and-the-arabs///SJ

Now, the logic of the security dilemma is such that in the absence of the credible U.S. provision of extended deterrence, Turkey would feel pressure to develop its own nuclear weapons. That it has not exerted itself in that direction, despite its formidable engineering and scientific capacities, illustrates the stability of Turkish trust in U.S. protection—until recently—and the ability of both sides to bracket the core security relationship away from various disagreements. As with other nuclear-armed states, should Turkey go its own way it would do so with no active intention of actually using such weapons, but rather as a kind of insurance policy against diplomatic extortion at the hands of other nuclear-armed powers.

But of course if Turkey, no longer tethered to U.S. security protection in one way or another, developed nuclear weapons for such a purpose, other regional states would probably feel obliged to develop or otherwise acquire their own weapons, if they could, as an insurance policy against nuclear extortion by Turkey.3 They have already practiced that way of thinking in reaction to the possibility of an Iranian nuclear breakout, of course.

Indeed, that kind of hedging behavior is exactly what analysts have discussed for many years now as the so-called N+ danger inherent in the development of Iranian nuclear weapons. It is not just the danger posed by Iranian nuclear weapons, bad enough as that would be, but the mousetrap effect of proliferation that would likely drive other states to want such an insurance policy: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Algeria, and so on.

Now, some observers have argued that nuclear weapons are really not very important after all. If the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as China, France, and the United Kingdom, survived the Cold War without any nuclear use, it must be because deterrence is easy and hence stable, since all rational people know that the weapons are unusable save for the since-become-impossible exception of a state holding a monopoly over them. One well-known scholar, Kenneth Waltz, argued persistently that the more nuclear the weapons the better—because they would sober everyone up and lead to more stability and fewer wars. Happily, those with actual government responsibility did not agree.

It is unspeakably lazy thinking to glibly superimpose the U.S.-Soviet Cold War deterrence experience onto places like the Middle East. It is, after all, one thing to maintain stable deterrence when there are only two, or a small number of, nuclear powers, and quite another to maintain stable deterrence when the number of nuclear actors gets larger and becomes somewhat open-ended as more states lean that way. Under such conditions it becomes much more difficult to calculate what a sufficient deterrent is, and so efforts to make sure of having “enough” can touch off a multilateral arms competition in which sufficiency becomes an ever-moving target, almost impossible to hit. At the same time it becomes much more difficult to imagine crisis stability if one or more states resort to launch-on-warning deployment postures, which are more likely when young arsenals are small and unprotectable against preemptive attack.

Other important potential differences between U.S.-Soviet Cold War deterrence and potential multiparty deterrence in the Middle East exist, too. Let us note just three.

First, U.S. and Soviet arsenals displayed clear lines of civil-military authority in highly institutionalized state systems, but many Middle Eastern countries lack both such clear lines of authority and highly institutionalized arrangements, being instead looser and more personalized by nature.

Second, it was taken for granted that both U.S. and Soviet leaderships cared about the safety of their populations, a necessary assumption for effective deterrence. But in some heterogeneous and authoritarian Middle Eastern countries this premise may not so surely apply—think both Iraq and Syria under minoritarian (and coincidentally Ba‘athi) leadership, both of which committed mass murder against its own citizens.

And third, U.S.-Soviet deterrence operations became inextricably bound up in the minds of observers with intercontinental ballistic missile delivery systems. The result is that some people today think that if missiles can be limited in one way or another, then the dangers of nuclear weapons, even if they come to exist, would be much mitigated. This is delusional because it is technologically obtuse. You need intercontinental ballistic missiles if you’re trying to shoot a warhead across an ocean. But if your enemy target is not across an ocean, but, as in the Middle East, quite nearby, airplanes are immensely less expensive and more reliable as delivery systems.

The basic point is that in both theory and practice, there is little difference between the proliferation stimulating effects of a Turkish nuclear weapons breakout and an Iranian one. So if the U.S.-Turkish strategic partnership unravels, logic does indeed suggest a Turkish effort to develop its own nuclear capabilities. (Of course, the same kinds of pressures pertain to other key countries were they to lose, one way or another, their U.S. nuclear umbrellas, including Germany, Japan, South Korea, and others.)

If that happens, the Turkish government could probably develop deliverable nuclear warheads at least on its side of the ocean within two to three years. If the Iranian government had thought for its own good reasons to avoid overt testing and breakout postures once the nuclear deal expires by calendar or “is expired” by volition, a Turkish bomb would make that posture far more difficult to justify. One could therefore imagine a situation of twinned or near-simultaneous breakouts of Turkish and Iranian nuclear weapons even a mere three, four, or five years from now. The shock to the region would be profound, and possibly very dangerous.

### ---xt: Prolif---Link

#### NATO prevents Turkish prolif now---but it’s the last barrier.

Larrabee & Nader 13, \*PhD, holds the Distinguished Chair in European Security at the RAND Corporation. \*\*MA, former International Policy Analyst at the Rand Corporation. (F. Stephen and Alireza, “Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East”, *RAND*, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\_reports/RR200/RR258/RAND\_RR258.pdf)

Turkey’s approach to the nuclear issue will heavily depend on U.S. policy and the credibility of the commitment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (**NATO**) members to Article V of the Washington Treaty on collective defense. As long as Turkey feels that NATO takes seriously Turkish security concerns, Ankara is unlikely to rethink its nuclear policy. However, if Turkish confidence in the U.S. and NATO commitment to its security weakens, Ankara could begin to explore other options for ensuring its security, **including the possible acquisition of its own nuclear deterrent.** Thus, maintaining the credibility of the commitment of alliance members to Article V remains critical.

#### Studies prove

Philip Baxter 15, Ph.D. Candidate in International Affairs, Science, and Technology at the Georgia Institute of Technology and a Senior Research Associate with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Turkey’s Nuclear Move: Deciphering the Developments”, https://duckofminerva.com/2015/10/turkeys-nuclear-move-deciphering-the-developments.html

A recent [article](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/turkey-secretly-working-nuclear-weapons-13898) in the National Interest by Hans Rühle, former Head of the Planning Staff in the German Ministry of Defense, argues that Turkey is positioning itself similarly to Iran in its leveraging of civilian nuclear power for potential nuclear weapons breakout capability. His argument, meant largely to justify German spying on the NATO-ally, posits that since Turkey is developing nuclear power plants, potentially developing its own nuclear fuel production capacity, and does not have a provision for spent nuclear fuel to be return to suppliers (a provision not necessary if producing fuel domestically), it is obviously shadowing the Iranian proliferation formula. These arguments are significantly flawed. While the Turkish movement into the nuclear arena could be afforded more clarity, particularly on the heels of a decade of efforts to corral the Iranian program, nefarious purposes should not be assumed; nor, are they immediately apparent. Rühle argues that the size of the nuclear industry that Turkey is planning, as well as the amount of fuel that would be needed to supply that industry, would provide ample material for a nuclear weapon. From a purely technical perspective, nuclear fuel from most civilian power reactors is not ideal for a weapons program. Turkey plans to construct four light-water pressurized reactors. These light-water reactors make breeding the type of plutonium necessary for nuclear weapons difficult – as purity is key in having a safe and reliable arsenal. Rühle dismisses the point that the less-pure plutonium from a civilian power reactor would not be used for military program. Rather, Ruhle argues that regardless of plutonium purity, a state will seek to acquire any form of nuclear material and use it for a nuclear arsenal. However, the quality of plutonium is a critical factor in understanding and forecasting proliferation strategies. Not all plutonium is created equal. Having impure plutonium in a nuclear arsenal, an arsenal that a nation would use to deter attack by other states, would be extremely dangerous. When uranium (particularly civilian reactor-grade uranium) is used in a power reactor, plutonium-239, the fissile material used for the production of nuclear weapons, is created. However, other by-products and isotopes of plutonium are also generated. The ratio of these by-products depends on the type of fuel you start with and how long the fuel is used in a power reactor. The longer it is in there, the less pure the plutonium output. While Rühle dismisses this point, other isotopes of plutonium which would be created in the civilian power reactor would be dangerous in a nuclear arsenal, particularly Pu-240 due to its unstable neutron flux which makes the long-term viability of the warhead questionable. With a quicker decay rate than Pu-239, comes the potential for spontaneously released neutrons – which is what starts the chain reaction to detonation. In the short-term, this is less of an issue, but the risk of unintended detonation increases over time. For a state that wishes to have a nuclear arsenal that will be able to deter the use or proliferation of nuclear weapons, a stable arsenal is critical for reliable use if necessary and for the warheads not to detonate on your own territory. The type of reactor that is used is also important. The reactor models that Turkey plans to build make hiding illicit activities, such as diverting material, difficult. Reloading the fuel in the models being sought halts reactor operations and would stop operations for days or weeks at time. Turkey desperately needs energy. It imports roughly [90% of its oil and natural gas, and is heavily reliant on coal](https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Turkey/turkey.pdf). Domestic energy production, particularly electricity, is lacking. Expanding its energy capacity is critical to Turkey’s economic development strategy. Shuttering a nuclear reactor for weeks or months at a time in order to extract costly fuel does not align with this policy objective. Further, plans for a nuclear energy sector of two dozen or so power reactors, with contracts in place already for eight, points to a desperate need for energy, not a mask for illicit activities. There are also significant differences in Iran and Turkey’s nuclear sectors. Iran purchased one power facility, Bushehr, from Russia, and then justified its expansion of uranium enrichment by the need for medical isotopes. This justification enabled Iran to enrich up to 20% U-235, which accounts for roughly 80% of the work load to get to weapons-grade material. In terms of breakout capacity, this strategy is designed to conduct enrichment in the open, and then quickly escalate to weapons-grade. Turkey, on the other hand, is justifying its nuclear expansion for economic reasons, driven by shortages in energy. Additionally, recent studies have found that a [lucrative market for mining and fuel production](https://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-T-Z/Turkey/) could be developed in Turkey. With developing nuclear energy sectors in number of countries (China, Vietnam, UAE, etc.), uranium ore and fuel services will likely be in greater demand. Again, the economic motivations appear to outweigh the security explanations. Furthermore, the International Atomic Energy Agency would also have greater access in Turkey than it did in Iran in the early years of the Iranian program. Currently, Turkey is a member in good standing and a signatory to the [Additional Protocol](https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/safeguards-legal-framework/additional-protocol) (AP). The current safeguards regime in Turkey, which includes the advanced monitoring and access that comes from the AP, requires early notification and cooperation with the IAEA as sites that deal with nuclear energy are developed. This access is well beyond what Iran was subjected to during the early stages of its program. As Turkey expands into nuclear energy, be it mining and milling or energy production, under the current safeguards regime, the IAEA would be engaged during the planning stages and would be able to identify at the outset possible anomalies. Turkey, in order to move into the nuclear arena, also [signed a Cooperative Nuclear Agreement](https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-110hdoc90/html/CDOC-110hdoc90.htm), known informally as a 123 Agreement, with the United States in 2008. This agreement places stringent controls on the technologies that Turkey receives from the US, or the technologies from any other state that has a 123 Agreement with the US. With the IAEA safeguards system and other international regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, this additional layer of protection would help to prohibit illicit use of materials Finally, Turkey’s external security outlook and alliance structure are also dramatically different than that of Iran’s. Scholars have examined in depth the determinants of proliferation, with security demands often found to be the primary motivating factor. However, Philipp Bleek and Eric Lorber, among others, have [found](https://jcr.sagepub.com/content/58/3/429.abstract) that security guarantees significantly reduce the likelihood for proliferation. While Iran could be said to have sponsor states in China and Russia, these relationships are largely driven by economic interests and self-interested foreign policy. Conversely, Turkey is a long-standing member of the NATO alliance. The Article V security guarantee ensures Turkey’s existential security. Iran lacked this protection.

#### US has 50 nukes in turkey—removal from NATO causes them to prolif

Fernholz 19- covers space, the economy and geopolitics for Quartz (Tim Fernholz “The US is rethinking the 50-plus nuclear weapons it keeps in Turkey,” Quartz, October 13, 2019, <https://qz.com/1727158/us-rethinking-the-50-plus-nuclear-weapons-it-keeps-in-turkey/)//mcu> ty owen

Turkish forces are pushing into northern Syria, replacing and sometimes even firing on the US troops retreating at Donald Trump’s orders. The question of whether Turkey, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is really a US ally was put to US defense secretary Mark Esper on Fox television this morning. “No, I think Turkey, the arc of their behavior over the past several years has been terrible,” he said. Which brings up a problem: **The US is storing perhaps 50 air-dropped thermonuclear bombs at its Incirlik Airbase in southern Turkey**, less than 100 miles from the Syrian border where this conflict is taking place. The nuclear stockpile dates back to the Cold War, when the US sought to keep a sufficient supply of atomic weapons deployed in Europe to deter potential Soviet aggression. Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy also host similar arsenals, and the US trains the participating nations in the use of the doomsday devices. Today, these bombs remain in place largely because of inertia, and the hope that countries like Turkey will see the depot as sufficient reason not to develop nuclear weapons of their own. It doesn’t seem to be working: Last month, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan said he could “not accept” efforts to prevent Turkey from developing its own atomic bombs. But instability in Turkey and the region, along with Ankara’s close relationship with Russia, have had American strategists talking about re-locating their weapons for years. (The US does not officially discuss the arsenal, but there is no indication that the stockpile has been removed.) A 2016 coup attempt against Erdogan saw power to the base cut off for several days, raising questions about the safety of the stash. More recently, Turkey has purchased advanced air defense technology from Russia, which has raised hackles in the US defense community because Turkey was a partner in developing the US F-35 fighter-bomber. The US Air Force canceled the partnership over worries that Russia would be able to learn from Turkey how to better shoot down US aircraft. Now, Russia and Turkey are coordinating military policy in northern Syria, with the US as a bystander. The move to exploit a civil conflict in Syria to gain a geopolitical advantage typify how strategists see a new era of great power competition playing out. One reason to be worried is that the recent shift in US strategy launched by Trump appears to have caught the US military establishment by surprise. It’s not clear how prepared the US is to deal with the knock-on effects of the about-face, whether it is disappointed former allies like the Kurds (paywall) or ISIS fighters escaping from prison camps, much less the calculus of nuclear deterrence.

### ---xt: Prolif---AT NPT Dead

#### NPT will survive despite member backlash over various issues

Lyon 20 [Rod Lyon is a senior fellow at ASPI. “Will the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Survive the 2020s?” 2-21, <https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/02/21/will_the_nuclear_nonproliferation_treaty_survive_the_2020s_115059.html>, y2k]

Treaty members will vent about a range of issues during the upcoming five-yearly review conference, scheduled to take place in New York from 27 April to 22 May. North Korean nuclear and missile developments, the trials of the Iranian nuclear deal, the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the continuing modernisation programs of the five recognised nuclear weapon states—instead of disarmament—provide plenty of new grist for the mill.

Still, every review conference seems to precipitate a sense of unease over the future of the treaty. This year’s no different. Yet the NPT will survive this conference, too, because most treaty members continue to believe that an uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons would make for a more dangerous international security environment than the one we already have. Moreover, few states would want the NPT to collapse and leave the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (which still hasn’t been ratified by enough states to enter into force) in sole possession of the field.

#### Even if it collapsed, the US can use the alliance network to tamp down proliferation

Onderco 20 [Michal Onderco, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at Erasmus University Rotterdam, “If Kroenig is right, the United States needs a new nonproliferation policy. Soon,” New Perspectives, 2020, Vol. 28(1) 118–122, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2336825X20908469>, y2k]

An argument could be made that even if the rest of the world somehow lost interest in the NPT, the United States would remain the ‘‘enforcer of last resort’’ (cf. Horovitz, 2015 for a version of this argument). This argument is consistent with the standard account of the success of the United States’ unilateral attempts to constrain the nuclear developments among friends and enemies alike (Gavin, 2012; Miller, 2018). Yet many of the tools that the United States would use to compel countries to give up their nuclear ambitions stem from the United States’ unique position within the international system, where the United States sits in the center of various political and economic networks (cf. e.g. Winecoff, 2015). These tools, however, work only as long as the United States and its allies dominate the world (Nexon, 2018). Yet the centrality of the United States in various networks comes under strain, not least because the United States decided to ‘weaponize’ these interdependence networks (Farrell and Newman, 2019). One only needs to listen to the repeated calls for alternative payment channels (such as the EU’s Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges, known as INSTEX, a channel for conducting business with Iran) and different currencies to settle transactions to understand the phenomenon (for a recent overview, see McDowell, 2019). And while the rising powers do not fundamentally question the goal of nonproliferation, they are not as heavily invested in it. Shell

#### Security commitments are key to effective non-prolif---sustains the NPT – Russia cooperation is irrelevant in a world with the NPT BUT we can walk and chew gum at the same time with prolif and Russia

Daalder 20 [Ivo Daalder, president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, served as U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 2009 to 2013, “Can 50 Years of Minimizing Nuclear Proliferation Continue?” 3-5, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/05/opinion/minimizing-nuclear-proliferation.html>, y2k]

Imagine we are living in the year 2030. New seismic activity indicates an underground nuclear explosion somewhere near the Arctic Circle. One more country announces it’s joining the once-exclusive club of nuclear weapons states that has now grown to 20 nations — more than double the number in 2020.

The trouble started in 2023, when a group of former allies of the United States renounced their adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and opted to acquire the very nuclear weapons capabilities that they foreswore decades earlier.

Since then, nations across the world had raced to acquire the bomb, and the global security situation had become increasingly precarious. Sooner or later, as centers of nuclear decision making multiplied, one of those weapons was bound to go off, with consequences incalculable for all.

A far-fetched future? Perhaps. The nonproliferation treaty entered into force 50 years ago, on March 5, 1970. At the time, only five nations — the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Britain and France — were recognized as nuclear weapons states. Just four more countries — India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea — have since acquired the bomb. And, yet, this scenario is more plausible now than many may think.

To understand why, we need to go back to 1963, when President John F. Kennedy warned of a “world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these weapons.” Kennedy expressed the widely held belief that further proliferation was likely, if not inevitable. Every nation that possessed the capability to build a bomb had done so and American officials worried that the trend was about to accelerate.

That didn’t happen. Having stood at the brink of nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union redoubled efforts to stabilize their nuclear relationship and prevent other states from crossing the nuclear threshold. The nonproliferation treaty was one result of those efforts. Under the treaty, states that didn’t have nuclear weapons pledged not to develop or acquire them, while those that did committed to eventual nuclear disarmament.

But it wasn’t just U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations that turned the proliferation tide in the 1960s. Even more important was Washington’s determination to assure its allies in Europe and Asia that they could rely on America for their nuclear security. Only after they were convinced that the American nuclear guarantee was credible, did allies like Germany and Japan decide to forego a national nuclear option and join the nonproliferation treaty.

Whenever new developments seemed to call the American guarantee into question — as when a new generation of Soviet medium-range missiles were deployed in Europe in the 1970s and when North Korea expanded its nuclear and missile programs in the 1990s and 2000s — Washington worked to reassure its allies that its nuclear commitment remained strong and credible.

In recent years, new questions about the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee have returned. One reason is the changing strategic environment. In Europe, a more adventurous and better-armed Russia no longer shies away from using military force, as its invasion of Ukraine and its support for the Assad regime in Syria have underscored. In Asia, China’s rapid rise has expanded its military reach throughout the Asia-Pacific, and North Korea has emerged as a potent foe, armed with nuclear weapons and long-range missiles that threaten the entire region.

Even as threats have multiplied, allied doubts about the American commitment have grown perceptibly since Donald Trump entered the White House expressing deep distrust of alliances. His early failure to reconfirm NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense commitment, his threat to leave NATO if allies did not sharply increase military spending, his insistence that Asian allies greatly increase their financial contributions to maintain the U.S. military presence, his musings about some allies acquiring their own nuclear capabilities — all these have increased uncertainty in allied capitals about whether they can still count on the United States.

Which raises the question: if not the United States, who will assure their nuclear security? So far, few experts argue that the answer lies in a national nuclear program. But as worries about America’s security commitments continue to grow, more countries may reach that conclusion.

To forestall this danger, Washington needs to act swiftly.

First, the president needs to unconditionally reaffirm America’s fundamental commitment to the security and defense of its allies. Yes, the allies need to do more and spend more, but it is in America’s vital interest to ensure that they are safe and secure — and without their own nuclear weapons.

Second, America and the other nuclear powers need to resume serious discussions on arms control. As a first step, Washington and Moscow need to extend the New START treaty capping their long-range nuclear forces before it expires next year. Next, along with Britain, France and China, they should start a serious dialogue on how to limit their nuclear capabilities and work together to prevent further proliferation. And all of them should halt nuclear modernization efforts while those talks continue.

For 50 years, the nonproliferation treaty has largely succeeded in preventing more countries from going nuclear. America’s security alliances have played an essential role in that success. Reaffirming those alliances and committing to serious arms control efforts can help ensure its continuation in the next 50 years.

### Expulsion Bad---ME

#### Turkey is an essential ally in NATO key to stabilization measures in the middle east

Pamir et al 20-- Ahmet Üzümcü- Former Director-General of the OPCW, Former Permanent Representative of Turkey to NATO, Mehmet Fatih Ceylan- Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, 2013-2018, Ümit Pamir- Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, 2004-2006 (“Turkey and NATO: resolving the S-400 spat,” European leadership network, 16 December 2020, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/turkey-and-nato-resolving-the-s-400-spat/)//mcu

But the critics do not stop there. There is the wider accusation of Turkish unreliability. It should not be forgotten that Turkey has been a reliable member of NATO for the past seven decades. It contributed significantly to the Alliance’s collective defence and deterrence in the Cold War. By tying up a large portion of Soviet troops in its region, it considerably reduced the pressure on Central Europe. Ironically, the Western European countries were able to build their Union gradually in a secure and stable environment ensured by NATO, with Turkey shouldering a heavy military burden. With the end of the Cold War, alone among the existing allies, Turkey’s security situation worsened. Turkey found itself increasingly exposed in a region of turmoil engulfed by several armed conflicts. The new and emerging security risks, including terrorism, have impacted Turkey as much, if not more, than any other Ally. Turkey feels itself on a new front line. But throughout this period, Turkey has remained an island of stability in a volatile region. Even though instability and disorder are on our doorstep, Turkey has fulfilled all its NATO obligations and provided security and stability rather than consuming them. Turkey has stood solid behind every key NATO decision. NATO invoked Article V of the Treaty for the first time following the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the U.S. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan had become a haven for international terrorism. As a staunch ally, **Turkey has played a significant role in NATO’s stabilization efforts in Afghanistan.** It has deployed troops and other military assets in harm’s way alongside other allies and partners. **Turkey has never deviated from the NATO policy “in together-adjust together-out together“.** Moreover, Turkey’s especially close and long-standing ties with Afghanistan has enabled the Alliance as a whole to benefit from its knowledge, expertise and political weight in that country. Moreover, the fight against ISIS, a serious concern for the whole world, would not have been so successful without Turkey’s participation and assistance. **Turkey has become an essential partner** in this struggle by joining the coalition against ISIS. It made three air bases, including Incirlik, available for the Allies, enabling decisively effective military operations. Elsewhere, in the Balkans and Iraq, **Turkey has contributed to NATO’s stabilization efforts**. In terms of NATO’s priority core task, collective defence, successive governments in Turkey have never wavered in their commitment to the Alliance. Turkey’s current contribution cannot be overstated. It currently hosts a range of NATO commands and and assets, essential to NATO’s collective defence, including Allied Land Command (LANDCOM) in Izmir and the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps (NRDC) in Istanbul. Significantly, Turkey will be the lead nation in 2021 in command of the ‘Spearhead Force’ of NATO (VJTF). This force can be deployed at short notice to any allied country considered under threat. We, as former Turkish Ambassadors to NATO, are proud to confirm that our country has assumed its responsibilities toward the Alliance in their entirety. Turkey is one of the few allies to fulfil its commitment to spend 2% of its GDP on defence; it has the second largest army in NATO, and it ranks fourth in contributions to NATO operations and fifth in NATO expenditures. In an Alliance of thirty nations, there are inevitably ups and downs in the relations between allies. In the past, these differences **have turned out to be circumstantial and temporary.** They were eventually resolved, mostly bilaterally, but sometimes with the use of good offices of the Secretary General or other Allies. **There is no reason to suppose that the current spate of disputes will not be resolved in the same way**. During the recent tension in the eastern Mediterranean, the NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, took the welcome initiative of inviting Greece and Turkey to agree upon deconfliction measures. The parties concerned must be engaged in a dialogue in order to achieve an equitable solution in line with international law. Other countries should facilitate this process by encouraging dialogue among two longstanding allies. To conclude, there needs to be a solution to the impasse presented by the procurement of Russian-made S400s and the U.S. decisions both to disengage Turkey from the F35 program and to apply sanctions on its ally’s defence procurement agency. A compromise would unleash much positive momentum. We believe that Turkey will continue to observe its obligations and commitments as a reliable member of the Alliance. It will continue to support the Alliance efforts toward global peace and security. **The Alliance would, no doubt, be weaker without the active participation and support of Turkey.**

#### Specifically, Afghanistan unstable now and will escalate drawing Pakistan, India, Iran, and Russia

CPA 5/11- aims to help policymakers devise timely and practical strategies to prevent and mitigate armed conflict around the world, especially in places that pose the greatest risk to U.S. interests.(Center for preventative Action, “War in Afghanistan,” Global Conflict Tracker, May 11 2022, <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-afghanistan>)//mcu

In February 2020, after more than a year of direct negotiations, the U.S. government and the Taliban signed a peace agreement that set a timeline for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Under the agreement, the United States pledged to draw down U.S. troops to approximately 8,500 within 135 days and complete a full withdrawal within fourteen months. In return, the Taliban pledged to prevent territory under its control from being used by terrorist groups and enter into negotiations with the Afghan government. However, no official cease-fire was put into place. After a brief reduction in violence, the Taliban quickly resumed attacks on Afghan security forces and civilians. Direct talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban began months after the agreed upon start of March 2020, faced multiple delays, and ultimately made little progress. Violence across Afghanistan continued in 2020 and 2021 as the United States increased air strikes and raids targeting the Taliban. Meanwhile, the Taliban attacked Afghan government and Afghan security forces targets and made territorial gains. Civilian casualties across Afghanistan have remained high over the past several years. The United Nations documented a then–record high of 10,993 civilian casualties in 2018. Although 2019 saw a slight decline, civilian casualties exceeded 10,000 for the sixth year in a row and brought the total UN-documented civilian casualties since 2009 to more than 100,000. Despite another decline in 2020, the first half of 2021 saw a record high number of civilian casualties as the Taliban ramped up their military offensive amid the withdrawal of international troops. In addition to the Taliban’s offensive, Afghanistan faces a threat from the Islamic State in Khorasan, which has also expanded its presence in several eastern provinces, attacked Kabul, and targeted civilians with suicide attacks. Uncertainty surrounding the future of international assistance has strained the Afghan economy. Although the United States and its allies pledged in late 2020 to continue providing support to the Afghan government, they could reduce aid following the Taliban takeover. Such a move could compound Afghanistan’s **deteriorating economic situation.** Concerns The United States has an interest in attempting to preserve the many political, human rights, and security gains that have been achieved in Afghanistan since 2001. The Taliban takeover of the country could once again turn Afghanistan into a terrorist safe haven, as the group is believed to maintain ties with al-Qaeda. The takeover also threatens to reverse advances made in securing the rights of women and girls. Moreover, **increasing internal instability, a mass exodus of refugees, and a growing humanitarian crisis could have regional ramifications as neighboring countries respond**. In addition, **Pakistan, India, Iran, and Russia are all likely to compete for influence** in Kabul and with subnational actors**.**

### ---xt: ME---AT NATO Withdrew

#### True, but that makes Turkish alignment with NATO all the more important

Yazici 21- is the Evans Hanson Fellow and Turkey researcher at the Institute for the Study of War. Ezgi leads ISW’s research efforts on Turkey and Turkey’s military and political activities abroad. She received her Bachelors of Arts in International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies from Tufts University where she also studied Arabic. Ezgi wrote her undergraduate thesis on the Turkish political and military intervention in northern Syria and published a paper on the de-facto Turkish control in northern Syria in Tufts University’s Undergraduate Journal of International Affairs. (Ezgi Yazici, “TURKEY AIMS TO PLAY STABILIZING ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER NATO WITHDRAWAL” Institute for the Study of War, Sep 3, 2021, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/turkey-aims-play-stabilizing-role-afghanistan-after-nato-withdrawal)//mcu

The Turkish Armed Forces left Afghanistan, but **Ankara is poised to play key security and diplomatic roles in the country**. Turkish officials announced the evacuation of the Turkish military contingency from the Kabul Airport on August 25, 2021, despite separate discussions with the United States and the Taliban for Turkey to continue running the Kabul International Airport.[1] Top Turkish officials had argued that the Turkish forces could continue to manage the security and operations of the airport as they had since 2015 if the Taliban so desired.[2] Ankara also pivoted to establishing relations with the Taliban through the Turkish Embassy in Qatar at least as early as August 15, when the Taliban reached Kabul, in a likely bid to maintain and expand the Turkish role in Afghanistan.[3] The bulk of Turkish forces left Afghanistan by August 27 under reported Taliban pressure, but the Turkish Embassy is continuing its operations as of September 3.[4] Recent statements by both the Taliban and Ankara indicate that Turkey is exploring ways to help run the Kabul Airport and support the new Taliban government.[5] Ankara and the Taliban both believe Turkey can play a role in shaping the new Afghanistan. Ankara will likely double down on its political and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan to **prove its ability to stabilize and shape conflicts as a regional power**. Turkey has provided training for Afghan security forces, political outreach to various Turkic communities, aid and private sector investment, and non-combatant military services. Turkey refrained from participating in military campaigns against the Taliban and instead took on logistical and security duties like Kabul Airport security, intelligence sharing, and funding and training at Afghan military schools.[6] Turkish officials leveraged this non-combatant history when they offered the Taliban further “technical and security assistance” in August.[7] Taliban spokesperson Mohammad Naeem said that the **Taliban wants Turkey’s support** in areas ranging from reconstruction and economy to healthcare and education on August 25.[8] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan views such a Turkish role as a natural one, underlining Turkey’s long-standing ties to its fellow Muslim country with a significant Turkic population. Ankara and the Taliban are also in talks about the future of Kabul Airport. President Erdogan stated that the Taliban asked Turkey to run the operations of Kabul International Airport if the Taliban provided its security instead of Turkish forces. However, anonymous Turkish officials claimed that Turkey would only run the airport in partnership with Qatar and only if security was provided by a private security firm of former Turkish soldiers.[9] SADAT International Defense Consultancy, known for credible reports of its supervision and payment of Turkish-backed Syrian fighters in Libya and Azerbaijan, is the only private Turkish security company that could adopt such a duty.[10] Discussions are ongoing as of September 3 and the Taliban’s position remains unclear. Turkey’s Ambitions and Constraints Afghanistan is a theater of opportunity, but not an existential security problem for Ankara. Afghanistan poses little direct threat to Turkish national security, in contrast to the perceived terrorism and internal stability threats the country is fighting in northern Iraq and Syria. Afghanistan’s current situation presents an opportunity for Ankara to maximize its political and security reach by filling growing gaps in foreign investment, projects, and support and by **advancing NATO interests**. Turkey can advance its mutual interests with NATO in Afghanistan while pursuing its own objectives as an aspiring power in the region. A successful bid in helping stabilize Afghanistan could elevate Turkey as a necessary and capable security player in the region and to its allies—two longstanding goals of the Erdogan government. During an August 25, 2021, speech to celebrate the anniversary of a historic Turkic battle, Erdogan said “We transformed from a country of existential battles inside its own borders to one that has a say in every critical matter in the world.”[11] This self-perception of Turkey as a regional powerbroker helps drive President Erdogan and Ankara’s top leadership’s pursuit of more activist policies beyond Turkey’s immediate neighborhood—including in Afghanistan.

### ---xt: ME---Link

#### Turkey is key to effective Afghanistan stabilization

Yazici 21- is the Evans Hanson Fellow and Turkey researcher at the Institute for the Study of War. Ezgi leads ISW’s research efforts on Turkey and Turkey’s military and political activities abroad. She received her Bachelors of Arts in International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies from Tufts University where she also studied Arabic. Ezgi wrote her undergraduate thesis on the Turkish political and military intervention in northern Syria and published a paper on the de-facto Turkish control in northern Syria in Tufts University’s Undergraduate Journal of International Affairs. (Ezgi Yazici, “TURKEY AIMS TO PLAY STABILIZING ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER NATO WITHDRAWAL” Institute for the Study of War, Sep 3, 2021, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/turkey-aims-play-stabilizing-role-afghanistan-after-nato-withdrawal)//mcu

Turkey will likely perceive one or multiple of the following objectives in the near term as advantageous to its regional and global standing: Deliver legitimacy to a new Afghan government: **As a Muslim NATO country**, Turkey could be a useful partner for the Taliban leadership to gain international acceptance and legitimacy as well as access to global financial systems. Advance the Turkish security role in line with, and beyond, NATO goals: Turkey has been offering military training and security cooperation deals to an increasing number of developing countries. Turkish forces have hosted Afghan, Somali, Azerbaijani, Pakistani, Libyan, and other security forces for capacity-building trainings as part of, or beyond, NATO missions. Turkey will likely continue its trainings with Afghanistan and offer new technical and military cooperation opportunities to the Taliban government. Insert Erdogan-friendly Turkish companies to Afghanistan for profit: Turkish companies with strong ties to the Erdogan government have won significant reconstruction contracts in Libya, Iraq, Somalia, Syria, and elsewhere. Turkey will likely look for similar construction and investment opportunities in Afghanistan for profit and to benefit the crony network Erdogan cultivates for government-friendly companies. Improve Turkey’s position within NATO: **Turkey is one of the few, if not the only, NATO countries that will maintain a diplomatic mission in Afghanistan.** It has also been in frequent contact with many NATO allies to discuss developments in Afghanistan and demand financial support.[12] Ankara will seek to use its unique position in and access to Afghanistan to improve relations with NATO allies, particularly the United States, and gain concessions. Position Turkey as a regional power for security and stabilization: President Erdogan suggested that Turkey, Turkic Central Asian countries, and Pakistan could work with the Taliban if they take “positive steps” during a speech on August 29.[13] Erdogan has not specified what those steps include or how Turkey might support them, but Turkey could leverage its ties to Central Asian countries to promote regional security initiatives. Meanwhile, Ankara also faces the risks of deteriorating public opinion, increased refugee flows, and growing financial costs

#### Turkey won’t play the spoiler in the Middle East

Dalay 21- Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme (Galip Dalay, “Middle East policy shows Turkey's new desire for allies,” Chatham House, May 20 2021, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/05/middle-east-policy-shows-turkeys-new-desire-allies)//mcu

But Turkey is now recalibrating its Middle East policy, with Ankara using more conciliatory language and, more importantly, taking steps to repair the ties with Egypt with a Turkish delegation headed by deputy foreign minister Sedat Onal visiting Cairo and foreign ministers of both countries expected to meet towards the end of May. It is plausible to anticipate Cairo and Ankara will exchange ambassadors and have more ministerial-level meetings, but a presidential-level meeting is not on the horizon For Ankara, a demarcation deal with Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean outweighs all other considerations because such a deal further prevents the emergence of a regional energy and security order in the Eastern Mediterranean without Turkey. But Egypt’s priority is the Libyan conflict and the presence of the Egyptian opposition actors and media in Istanbul. Given the long existence of shared border and security concerns, Libya is to Egypt what Syria is to Turkey, and so **the broader context of Turkish outreach efforts towards Egypt** **is the sense in Ankara that the Middle East is in a post-Arab Spring era with the significance of political Islam – specifically the Muslim Brotherhood – in regional politics dramatically decreased.** Agreement through compromise Instead of a full-fledged normalization, Turkey and Egypt will end up meeting each other halfway at best. Egypt is unlikely to sign a maritime demarcation deal with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean anytime soon, but will be mindful of Turkey’s claimed maritime borders and the parameters of the Turkish-Libyan maritime deal when signing deals with third countries or international energy companies. In response, Turkey will likely adopt a more accommodating stance towards Egypt in Libya, with Ankara more receptive to Egyptian demands to withdraw pro-Turkish Syrian fighters from there. But this withdrawal will be conditional on the withdrawal of other foreign fighters from Libya, including Russian Wagner fighters, and Ankara continues to resist the demand for Turkish forces leaving, citing the argument they are there as a result of an agreement with Libya’s UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). To placate Egypt, Turkey is pressuring the Istanbul-based Egyptian opposition media to tone down criticism of the regime, but is unlikely to ask Egyptian opposition figures to leave Turkey as many of them have acquired either Turkish citizenship or legal residence. It is plausible to anticipate Cairo and Ankara will exchange ambassadors and have more ministerial-level meetings, but a presidential-level meeting is not on the horizon. Saudi relations in deep crisis On the Turkish-Saudi front, relations were left in deep crisis by a personal vendetta between the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which developed following the killing of journalist Jamal Khassoghi at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul. This means a thaw in the relations is more difficult to achieve, and the prospect appears to be for a more turbulent period in Ankara-Tehran relations as the number of disputes between them increases. **Motivation for this desire to repair relations with the Arab states is the fact that any new nuclear deal between the US and Iran is highly likely to affect the regional blocks** But Turkish desires to mend the ties with Saudi Arabia are strong, as evidenced by Turkey foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu visiting Riyadh despite the announcement eight Turkish schools are to close in the kingdom and the imposition of an unofficial boycott on Turkish goods. On the Yemen conflict, Ankara is likely to adopt a more pro-Saudi position and to continue reaching out to Saudi Arabia for a rapprochement. Motivation for this desire to repair relations with the Arab states is the fact that any new nuclear deal between the US and Iran is highly likely to affect the regional blocks. In fact, Tehran and Ankara are increasingly engaging in acrimonious exchanges, leaving their relations currently rather tense – **these growing strains in Turkish-Iranian relations further reinforce Turkish desire to mend the ties with the Arab states.** Turkey’s militarized regional policy – heavily in vogue from 2016-20 and relatively risk-free thanks to Donald Trump’s US presidency – has now run its course, with the exception of operations in Iraq. In its place, there are now three major factors shaping the new Turkish approach – the new US administration, a prospective deal between the US and Iran and its impact on regional blocks in the Middle East, and an anti-Turkey geopolitical realignment in the Eastern Mediterranean. From a wider foreign policy perspective, it is clear **Turkey is working hard to end both its international isolation and its loneliness in the Eastern Mediterranean region.**

### ---xt: ME---Impact

#### Turkey’s key to ME stabilization

Sandano 3/4- Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Sindh (IMRAN ALI SANDANO, “Change in Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East,” MAR 04, 2022, https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/change-in-turkish-foreign-policy-toward-the-middle-east)//mcu

Turkish foreign policy mainly aims to protect its interests in a strained global and regional environment. Turkey always tried to create conditions for sustainable peace and development with both neighboring and more distant states. Ankara has recently become more involved and active in the Middle East. Some analysts are of the view that this change indicates Turkey is moving away from the West, as they observe that Turkey's confidence in the region is mismatched with its Western coordination. However, others believe that security, power projection, rational considerations and a mix of national interests have forced Turkey to drive its foreign policy toward the Middle East. After the Arab uprising, regional geopolitics and security challenges opened new channels for Turkish foreign policy, which led Ankara to even get involved in the region. It started humanitarian and economic engagements. With the passage of time, Ankara’s involvement in the Middle East has extended and it has become the third party in the regional conflicts. To normalize ties with the Middle Eastern countries, especially with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel, would open new channels for augmenting Turkey’s diplomatic, strategic and economic assets in its foreign policy. The strained ties the between leading regional actors have proven deleterious to understanding the true prospect of economic relations. A shift and a response The shift in Ankara’s Middle East policy is a response to external factors – both regional and international, and domestic issues related to security and economy. Turkey has begun to change its positions and restart its relations, which had previously been based on hostility. Washington has always remained a key player in the Middle East, but the United States administration under President Joe Biden prioritized East Asia, focused on its own domestic matters and has pushed away diplomacy in the Middle East, unlike the previous Donald Trump administration. In the meantime, the U.S. has started reevaluating its military forces from the region. The U.S. has made it clear that it will not be part of the Saudi intervention of Yemen, and Washington may go back to the nuclear deal with Iran. These changes triggered and pushed Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt and the UAE towards a de-escalation process. On the other hand, Russia's growing influence and the U.S. decreasing engagement in the region pushed Turkey to act it to balance between the two. Turkey has a long relationship with the U.S. and Russia, but with some differences – however, it has maintained a good balance in Syria and Libya. In this context, **Ankara’s Middle East policy has shifted into a new track to rebalance the region**. Saudi Arabia a key actor Last year at the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit, Gulf countries signed the Al-Ula declaration and formally ended the dispute with Qatar. This regional development created further encouragement for Ankara to take the plunge with Riyadh, Cairo and Abu Dhabi. Since then, Turkey and Qatar have started negotiations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE for reconciliation. Saudi Arabia is one key regional player in the Middle East region. The good relations between Ankara and Riyadh would prove to be a game changer for this region. **The cooperation initiative has been started between Ankara and Riyadh**, their relations have appeared in a positive dynamic after a phone conversation between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Saudi Arabia’s King Salman ahead of a G-20 leaders summit in 2021. Recently, Erdoğan visited the UAE for bilateral and economic cooperation with a flurry of agreements during his first visit to the Gulf state since 2013. No doubt, Riyadh also wants close relations with Ankara, which will help Saudi to counter rivals or disrupters. The normal ties between Riyadh and Ankara would take preference over all regional reconciliation efforts. This move would be a good option for Saudi Arabia to get much-needed space to enhance its capacity for political activity, connectivity, and cooperation with various other regional states, which are perceived as Riyadh’s rivals. **Better relations between both states would open new economic, political and defense opportunities**, where Saudis may retain their traditional regional role and effectively deal with security challenges. The regional power game between the main stakeholders of the region is persistent strategic competition, which will **only destabilize** their diplomatic positions, and create more economic cost than benefits. The current developments and the changing nature of their regional de-escalation approach is a sign of a **reconciliatory drift** in the region, which will normalize the strategic and economic situation in the region. To sum up, regardless of the problems in balancing Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel, the current change in the foreign policy of the Middle East is a good option for Turkey to move forward with win-win cooperation. Certainly, Turkey possesses such capability to go with Middle Eastern countries for their collective cooperation.

#### Middle East war escalates.

Lantier 19, PhD @ Geneva (Alex, “Syrian army, Iran threaten counterattack against Turkish invasion of Syria,” <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2019/10/14/syri-o14.html>)

The conflicts erupting between the different capitalist regimes in the Middle East pose an imminent threat not only to the population of the region, but to the entire world. Workers can give no support to any of the competing military plans and strategic appetites of these reactionary regimes. With America, Europe, Russia and China all deeply involved in the proxy war in Syria, a large-scale Middle East war could strangle the world oil supply and escalate into war between nuclear-armed powers. The working class is coming face to face with the real possibility of a Third World War.

### Swindland Bad

#### Inducting Sweden and Finland leaves NATO exposed and vulnerable to Russian aggression.

Emma Ashford 22. Senior fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. "NATO Should Think Twice Before Accepting Finland and Sweden." Washington Post. 5-30-2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/nato-should-think-twice-before-accepting-finland-and-sweden/2022/05/30/b412ee2a-dff7-11ec-ae64-6b23e5155b62\_story.html. accessed 6-21-2022 //ART

Yet from the point of view of existing NATO members — and particularly the US — it’s still not necessarily a net win. Finland and Sweden have long focused their militaries on defending their own territories, raising doubts about their value in contributing to a common defense, which is at the heart of NATO’s charter.

And while both nations have pledged to increase their military spending and ability to bolster Europe’s broader defenses, it is also possible that they would not. Instead, they may free-ride on America’s military strength — and its nuclear umbrella — as so many European states have done for years. According to the International Monetary Fund, neither country comes close to meeting the NATO goal of spending 2% of GDP on defense.

History suggests the most likely outcome is two more states adding to America’s defense burden at a time when Washington should be pivoting to Asia.

Consider also the question of the defensibility of new NATO territory. Admitting Sweden could be strategically beneficial, allowing NATO forces to better control the Baltic Sea and to use Gotland Island, at an important chokepoint off the Baltic States, as a staging ground for any future conflict.

Finnish territory, in contrast, is a strategic nightmare. It would dramatically increase the alliance’s exposure to any future attacks by Moscow: the country shares an 800-mile border with Russia that, as a recent study from the Center for Strategic and International Studies put it, is “highly exposed to Russian military threats.”

There are grab bag of other reasons for caution, including the usual concerns about expanding the alliance to an ever-more unwieldy set of member states. It doesn’t take a genius to predict that 32 nations will be even harder to manage than 30. Before its Ukraine moment, NATO was struggling to maintain the peace between Greece and Turkey, few nations were meeting the 2% spending goal, and President Emmanuel Macron of France had drawn headlines for suggesting the alliance was experiencing “brain death.”

Even in the face of Russia’s aggression, support for adding the two members isn’t unanimous. Turkey’s vehement opposition to Finland and Sweden may be an attempt to wring political concessions from the alliance, but also owes a lot to these countries’ support for Kurdish causes.

Alliance leaders should also consider the risk of Russian overreaction. Moscow has started three wars over potential NATO expansion — invading Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014 before the current war. While Moscow is clearly not able to stage another major military campaign right now, one cannot rule out President Vladimir Putin doing something irrational in response to a NATO expansion that takes the alliance within 200 miles of his birthplace of St. Petersburg.

At the same time, it’s not clear that Finland and Sweden are at increased risk unless they are allowed NATO membership. They have long relied on their neutral status and domestic defense capacity to prevent crises. Refusing to admit them to NATO is not hanging them out to dry, but simply retaining a workable status quo.

#### Expansion alienates Russia---triggers arms racing and escalation.

Stephen Collinson 22. Politics Reporter at CNN. "The most striking aspect of Sweden and Finland's application to join NATO." CNN. 5-18-2022. https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/18/europe/sweden-finland-nato-analysis-intl/index.html. accessed 6-21-2022 //ART

The most striking aspect of Sweden and Finland's application to join NATO is how little debate there is about whether it's a wise idea.

The entry of the two Nordic nations would be the most significant geopolitical outcome of the Ukraine war, transforming the strategic security picture in northeastern Europe and adding hundreds of miles of direct NATO borders with Russia.

For decades, even during the most tense moments of the Cold War, neither country seemed to feel the need to join the Western military alliance despite their proximity to the giant to their east. But that changed this year, after Putin sent tanks rolling across the border into Ukraine in February.

Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson on Sunday called the invasion of Ukraine "illegal and indefensible," and worried that Moscow might do something similar "in our immediate vicinity." Finnish President Sauli Niinistö told CNN the same day that the invasion indicated Russia was ready to attack an "independent, neighboring country."

Many analysts believe that one of the main goals of Russia's invasion was to weaken NATO by taking Kyiv's possible future membership off the board. If so, it has backfired spectacularly. The alliance is now stronger and more united than it has been for years, and it could soon be much larger.

But expanding NATO could also trigger serious reverberations. Doubling the security alliance's direct frontier with Russia would be a personal blow for Putin, who has focused on undermining the Western alliance since he first became Russia's President, more than 20 years ago. And if Putin felt Russia was already being hemmed in on its western flank, could adding two more NATO members during the worst tension between the West and Moscow in decades exacerbate the Russian leader's paranoia?

In the 1990s, revered US diplomat George Kennan — the founder of the Cold War containment policy of Russia — warned that NATO expansion would alienate Russia and cause an adverse reaction. A contemporary counterargument would be that Moscow's terrible losses in Ukraine, dented military prowess and failure to siege Kyiv show that it is too weak to do anything about an expanding NATO. And why should Putin get any say in who joins the alliance anyway?

The Kremlin's response to Finland and Sweden hasn't exactly been thundering so far. But it's still a formidable nuclear power and any decision to move missiles or tactical nuclear weapons closer to NATO borders could trigger a new game of brinkmanship in Europe.

#### Sweden and Finland in NATO incurs multiple paths of Russian retaliation---provocations, cyberattacks, energy wars, etc.

Holly Ellyatt 22. Correspondent at CNBC. “NATO is about to get bigger and Putin is unhappy: Here are 3 ways Moscow could react.” CNBC. 5-17-2022. https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/16/how-could-russia-react-to-finland-sweden-joining-nato.html. accessed 6-21-2022 //ART

1) More NATO provocations

Over the years, Russia has made repeated provocative incursions near or into NATO allies’ airspace and these seem to have increased in frequency in the last few years. With Sweden’s and Finland’s latest move to join NATO, experts believe the alliance should prepare itself for more provocations from Russia.

“This changes the security environment for the entire Baltic Sea and for the Arctic,” retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, former commanding general of the U.S. Army in Europe, told CNBC on Monday.

“Of course there will continue to be airspace violations, just like there are over other NATO countries, but we’re a defensive alliance and we’re going to react coolly and professionally. The last thing that the Russians want is to get into a fight with all 30 NATO nations, soon to be 32,” he told CNBC’s “Capital Connection.”

“[Putin’s] going to complain about it, he’s going to threaten things but he actually has nothing that he can do as most of his military is tied up in Ukraine, so I don’t see any real threat against Sweden or Finland.”

Russian provocations of NATO are nothing new. In 2020, NATO air forces across Europe were scrambled more than 400 times to intercept unknown aircraft approaching the alliance’s airspace with almost 90% of these missions in response to flights by Russian military aircraft, NATO said in a statement.

Last March, NATO planes were scrambled 10 times in a six-hour period in response to an “unusual peak” of Russian warplanes near the alliance’s airspace over the North Atlantic, North Sea, Black Sea and Baltic Sea.

2) Cyberattacks and soldiers

Sweden and Finland have both insisted that joining NATO is not a move against Russia but both concede the decisions have been taken in light of Moscow’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

Sweden’s prime minister, Magdalena Andersson, told CNBC on Sunday that her country felt NATO membership was the best thing for its security, saying “what kind of retaliation there can be is up to Putin, we see there can be cyberattacks and hybrid attacks and other measures, but it is all up to them,” she told CNBC’s Steve Sedgwick in Stockholm.

Meanwhile, Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde said in the transition period before Sweden and Finland become full NATO members, heightened tensions are likely, noting “we foresee more military troops close to our border.”

3) Energy wars

Another potential space for retaliation, and possible Russian punishment for NATO’s expansion, could come in the energy sphere.

Russia still holds a powerful card in this area because it has traditionally accounted for around 40% of the EU’s gas imports. And while Europe scrambles for alternative energy sources to reduce its dependence on Russia as a provider of oil and gas, it is still reliant on it.

Gilles Moec, group chief economist at AXA Investment Managers, said in a note Monday that there was an “ever so present possibility Russia ‘turns the tap off’ its supply to the EU” although he noted that, so far Moscow has restricted itself to “half measures” which have not dried up supply — reflecting the country’s own dependence on these financial resources.

A day after Finland’s leaders announced their support for NATO membership, Russian state-owned utility company Inter RAO announced it would stop exporting electricity to Finland from Saturday (Finland gets about 10% of its electricity from Russia) citing a lack of payment as a reason, although the move was widely seen as retaliatory.

#### Escalates to nuclear war

Buchanan 22, author of “Nixon’s White House Wars: The Battles That Made and Broke a President and Divided America Forever.” (Pat, “Why would US give a war guarantee — to Finland?,” *The Journal*, <https://www.journal-news.net/why-would-us-give-a-war-guarantee-to-finland/article_01922d40-31e0-5711-9225-ee78c610b3e4.html)//BB>

Nervous about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intentions, Finland wants America legally and morally bound to fight Russia on its behalf, should Putin invade Finland as he invaded Ukraine. From the Finnish point of view, this is perfectly understandable. But why would the United States consent to go to war with Russia, the largest nuclear power on earth, for violating Finland’s frontiers? Finland is not Alaska; it is not Canada; it is 5,000 miles away. And no one ever asserted during the Cold War, or for the decades since, that Finland was a U.S. vital interest. Why, then, would we consent, in advance, to go to war with Russia over Finland? President Joe Biden said last week that NATO has an “open door” policy and Finland and Sweden are welcome, and he looks forward to their joining. Consider what Biden is actually saying and doing here. He is ceding to Finland, a country of 5.5 million people with an 830-mile border with Putin’s Russia, the right to obligate the United States of America to go to war with Russia, if Russia attacks Finland. What patriot would commit his own country, in perpetuity, to go to war on behalf of another country not his own? Why would America surrender to the Finns our freedom of action in deciding whether or not to fight a nuclear-armed Russia? NATO is not a country club; it is a military alliance Putin regards as an enemy. Every member of that alliance is obliged to treat an attack on any one of its 30 members as an attack on all, and all are obligated to come to the defense of the nation attacked. By welcoming Finland into NATO, Biden is offering Helsinki the kind of war guarantee Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain gave to Poland in the spring of 1939, which led to Britain’s having to declare war on Sept. 3, 1939, two days after Germany invaded Poland. How did that work out for Britain and the empire? In his farewell address, President George Washington warned his countrymen against “permanent alliances.” In conscious echo of our first president, Thomas Jefferson warned against “entangling alliances.” NATO is a military alliance that has been in existence since 1949. While it began with the U.S., Canada and 10 European nations, it ended the Cold War with 16. We have since added 14 more. Six of the nations NATO added since the Cold War — Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania — were members of the USSR’s Warsaw Pact. Three of the newest NATO members — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania — are former republics of the Soviet Union. The last quarter-century of NATO’s encroachment into Russia’s space and onto Russia’s front porch has been a leading cause of the worsening relationship between the world’s two great nuclear powers. The repeated refusal of Biden and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to rule out NATO membership for Ukraine was a primary cause of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This does not absolve Putin of culpability in launching the war on Ukraine, but it should tell us that any new members of NATO, in Russia’s “near abroad,” especially a new NATO member with an 830-mile border with Russia from the Baltic to the Arctic, is running a real risk and raising the possibility of war. Indeed, with Russia’s war in Ukraine in stalemate, having failed to achieve its objectives in Kyiv, Kharkov and Odessa, Russian officials have repeatedly raised the prospect of a desperate resort to tactical nuclear weapons to stop the bleeding. “Escalate to de-escalate” is the slogan. Bringing Sweden and Finland into NATO, which has already elicited rage from Moscow and ominous threats, is unlikely to reduce whatever pressure currently exists to escalate to nuclear war.

### AT Baltic War

#### There’s no chance of US/Russia war.

Aleksandr Khramchikhin 18, Deputy Director of the Institute for Political and Military Analysis in Moscow, 1/25/2018, “Rethinking the Danger of Escalation: The Russia-NATO Military Balance”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/25/rethinking-danger-of-escalation-russia-nato-military-balance-pub-75346

In an atmosphere of crisis permeated by mutual recriminations and suspicions, both sides—NATO and Russia—have engaged in a series of military activities along the line of contact. These maneuvers in turn have triggered multiple warnings from both sides of a sharp deterioration in European security, a growing threat of a military confrontation between Russia and NATO, and an urgent need to deescalate the situation in order to avoid a catastrophic war with disastrous consequences for all. An emerging conventional wisdom maintains that the new Cold War in Europe, if allowed to continue unchecked, runs the risk of escalating into a hot war unless steps to reduce tensions are taken swiftly.

But conventional wisdom is often wrong, and so it is this time. The hysteria that has engulfed public commentary throughout Europe about this ostensibly dire military situation on the brink of getting out of hand has little, if any, basis in fact. Both sides in the standoff exaggerate the tensions and the danger of escalation, and the risks of the military moves—their own and their adversary’s—supposedly driving these tensions.

In reality, the military balance between Russia and NATO is stable, the danger of escalation is hardly approaching critical levels, and little needs to be done militarily to defuse the current tensions. The true cause of the tensions is not military, but political and diplomatic. Until those causes are resolved, tensions between Russia and the West will remain high. The likelihood of a military confrontation will remain low, however, because neither side’s posture points to a heightened state of readiness or intention to go on the offensive. Until that changes, political and diplomatic tensions will remain mere tensions.

THE BALANCE, THEN AND NOW

The best evidence that the military situation in Europe is stable and that the continent is not on the brink of World War III is in the forces that each side has available for conducting military operations. Even a brief comparison of the present-day arsenals of Russia and NATO to those of the Soviet Union and NATO during the height of the Cold War should allay fears of military conflict (see table 1). This comparison should also take into account critically important political and psychological factors. Russia’s and NATO’s present-day forces do not measure up well against their predecessors of a generation ago.

One remarkable feature of the present situation is that even though the number of NATO member states has nearly doubled since the end of the Cold War, the alliance’s order of battle across many classes of weaponry has decreased since 1982, when East-West tensions were high. Over the past quarter century, military technology has developed rapidly, new weaponry has come online, and many advances in warfare have taken place. However, the arsenals of most European countries have had minimal qualitative improvements that do not begin to compensate for the major reductions in their military capabilities. Major acquisitions of military hardware have been limited mostly to wheeled armored personnel carriers (APCs) to be employed in expeditionary warfare.

The size of the U.S. military presence in Europe has decreased to an even greater degree since the end of the Cold War. At the beginning of 2016, the U.S. military had deployed ten brigades in Germany, but only two of these (the 2nd cavalry regiment and 12th combat aviation brigade) were actual fighting elements; the remaining eight were purely support units.1 One American airborne brigade is deployed in Italy.2 In 2017, the U.S. Air Force component deployed in Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom had nine wings, but these are primarily support units, and there are only six fighting squadrons.

These cuts in military hardware are consistent with a general tendency in the West (to a greater extent in Europe than in the United States) to embrace ideas of hedonism, pacifism, postmodernism, tolerance, and political correctness. A 2016 Pew survey found that Europeans overall, with the exception of the Poles and Dutch, do not support increasing defence spending. Many Europeans are reluctant to support the use of hard power in international affairs. A 2017 Pew survey found that Europeans are also divided in terms of their willingness to come to a NATO ally’s defense against Russia, with Germany, the UK, and Spain demonstrating the least support. Along with the falling birth rates experienced in these countries, this shift in defense dynamics makes it virtually impossible to conduct a war that would result in major loss of life.

As a result of these shifts in attitudes and ideological trends, NATO troops may be unlikely to demonstrate heroism and willingness to make sacrifices, elements that are absolutely essential in wartime. Almost all NATO countries have transitioned to an all-volunteer military force, which has further decreased the motivation of their military personnel, or at least suggests that they are motivated more by money than by patriotism. The transition to an all-volunteer force has also resulted in increased defense spending, for reasons that deserve further consideration.

Like those of its NATO rivals, Russia’s modern-day military capabilities do not compare favorably with the combined military machine of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies (see table 2). Even a cursory comparison of Soviet and Eastern European militaries at the height of the Cold War—in 1982—and now makes clear that Russia is not poised for offensive action in the European theater.

THE HIGH COST OF WAR

NATO forces are highly sensitive to the risk of incurring casualties, and this heightened sensitivity was one of the reasons many Western countries chose to develop a concept of noncontact network-centric warfare heavily reliant on precision-guided munitions (PGM). However, this approach requires extremely expensive weaponry, equipment, ammunition, and supplies. Shrinking NATO military forces and arsenals mean that significant losses of lives or hardware have become unacceptable: losing even a few tanks and aircraft is now almost a catastrophe, comparable to losing a battleship or an armored division.

A high-intensity war that calls for large stocks of ammunition is also becoming prohibitively expensive—a trend illustrated by the evolution of wars that NATO countries have waged over the last quarter century. In 1991, NATO countries, with significant support from both Egypt and Syria, roundly defeated Iraq’s large and well-equipped army in Operation Desert Storm. The coalition against Iraq used PGMs only against high-value targets in the Desert Storm campaign.

### AT Arctic War

#### No Arctic war---their ev is all hype.

Øystein Tunsjø 20, professor and head of the Asia programme at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Norwegian Defence University College, “The Great Hype: False Visions of Conflict and Opportunity in the Arctic,” Survival, Vol. 62, No. 5, 09-23-2020, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2020.1819649

In recent years there has been an abundance of studies, reports, articles and statements presenting the Arctic as a new frontier for resource extraction and sea lanes of communication.1 These studies claim that the receding Arctic ice provides not just commercial opportunities, but also security challenges that could fuel great-power rivalry and conflict.2 Yet, despite the hype, there is little likelihood of a shipping bonanza or a natural-resource boom in the Arctic.3 This does not mean that climate change is unimportant for the region – we can expect more shipping activity, investment and competition as the ice cap recedes. But it is important to maintain a balanced view of the opportunities and challenges presented by the ‘new Arctic’.4

Equally important, the stakes in a changing Arctic are not high enough to warrant a great-power conflict. As in the past, it remains unlikely that military force will be used to resolve a conflict originating in the Arctic. It is more likely that any potential great-power competition in the High North between Russia and NATO will reflect the more consequential sources of competition and conflict in Eastern or Southern Europe – in other words, that conflict might spill over into the High North from somewhere else.5 Developments in the Arctic appear to have caused some observers to forget that Russia’s recent naval build-up is primarily focused on safeguarding traditional Russian security interests, such as maintaining its sea-based nuclear deterrent and contesting sea lanes of communication in the North Atlantic. Thus, it is a familiar security challenge – Russia’s rivalry with the United States and NATO over the European security order – that has the highest potential for creating conflict in the Arctic.

Similarly, the recent focus on China’s Arctic ambitions minimises the importance of the changing balance of power in East Asia as the primary source of US–China competition. Beijing’s foremost security concern is the US response to China’s activities in its own maritime periphery, but Chinese behaviour will also determine the United States’ global strategic priorities. Sino-American competition will compel the US to prioritise the Asia-Pacific, and thus to draw down its commitments to other regions. This will constrain its options in the High North.

Since European states are unprepared to substitute for American power, Russian advancements in Europe and the Arctic will primarily reflect US retrenchment and European inertia, rather than improved Russian capabilities. Moreover, heightened US–China competition in the Arctic, much like heightened competition with Russia, will be a spillover effect of US–China rivalry in East Asia.

The new Arctic: land of opportunity?

One of the leading champions of the new Arctic has been the Norwegian government. It defined the region as a national priority in 2005 and launched an international diplomatic offensive to increase international awareness of its supposedly vast potential. In a speech in 2006 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, Norway’s then-minister for foreign affairs Jonas Gahr Støre declared that ‘in the years to come … the High North will be one of the most important strategic areas in the world’.6 In 2014 Oslo released ‘Norway’s Arctic Policy’, which stated that ‘the Arctic is the Norwegian Government’s most important foreign policy priority’, adding that ‘access to energy resources and other natural resources is becoming easier, and new trade routes are opening up in the north. All this is creating new opportunities.’7 Such claims have been echoed in other countries too. US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, for example, emphasised in a speech to the Arctic Council in May 2019 that

the Arctic is at the forefront of opportunity and abundance. It houses 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil, 30 percent of its undiscovered gas, and an abundance of uranium, rare earth minerals, gold, diamonds, and millions of square miles of untapped resources … Steady reductions in sea ice are opening new passageways and new opportunities for trade.8

This kind of public diplomacy, along with exaggerated media reporting, appears to have contributed to the circulation of imprudent claims and unfounded assumptions about the opportunities presented by the new Arctic – and about the likelihood of conflict in the region.9

#### Russia’s peaceful in the Arctic and will pursue cooperation.

Jeremy Tasch 20. Professor of Geography & Environmental Planning, Towson University. “Why the Talk of an ‘Artic Cold War’ Is Exaggeration”. Valdai Club. Jul 7 2020. https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/why-the-talk-of-an-artic-cold-war-is-exaggeration/

As Russia’s government has promoted a more visible presence in the Arctic—nervously observed by international governments aware of Russia’s increased military presence in its High North—a few related critical points seem often disregarded.

In summer 2007, while both the Mir-1 and Mir-2 submersibles were assisting a planned Russian government expedition to map the seabed, the famous flag-planting performance was funded by Frederik Paulsen, a Swedish pharmaceutical entrepreneur and the event was organized by an Australian-American group of deep-sea exploration enthusiasts. In other words, this feat, which drew the ire of Canada’s Foreign Minister and focused international media attention on a “new Cold War,” was unlikely prearranged either to perform scientific research in support of Russia’s Lomonosov territorial claims nor as a statement of territorial acquisition.

Although Moscow has always maintained interest in its Arctic, arguably this interest is growing. A Russian naval doctrine acknowledges that the Arctic is among its priority regions, and Russia not only already possesses the world’s largest fleet of nuclear icebreakers but plans to increase its size. This is used by some Western commentators to point to Russia’s military advantage relative to the United States in the Arctic. From here, it then is a short-stretch for some commentators to note that the 2014 events concerning Russian-Ukrainian relations demonstrate Russia’s readiness to bend and at times break the rules of international conduct.

But as have other Arctic and non-Arctic states, so too has Russia benefited from international cooperation and rules-following in the Arctic. This is not least because the complexities of operating in the Arctic’s exceptional environment demonstrates that collaboration is inherently positive. It is this “exceptional environment” that makes certain Arctic endeavors—such as search and rescue efforts, scientific research, and marine pollution response—transnational, and consequently encourages collective responses. Further, the economic development of the Arctic—a transnational region with major emerging market opportunities—is a key strategic objective of Russia. President Putin, for example, recognizes that “The Northern Sea Route as an international transport artery will rival traditional trade lanes.” Businesses require certainty and regulatory stability in order both to minimize their risks and to pursue investing in the Arctic. Uncertainties associated with an unstable political environment can lead to a reduction in investment and diminished economic interest in the Arctic—a situation both Arctic and non-Arctic stakeholders are determined to avoid.

Although the placement on August 3, 2007 of a titanium flag on the seabed grabbed headlines, this was not the first time a flag was planted in the vicinity of the North Pole. On his third polar expedition, and his eighth and final journey to the circumpolar north—later investigated and approved by the National Geographic Society—US Commander R. E. Peary placed an American flag at a point on the ice-covered Arctic Sea, somewhere nearby the earth’s north geographical pole. To commemorate this event, Peary claims to have written a note, placed it in a glass bottle, and then hid it in an ice crevice:

I have this day hoisted the national ensign of the United States of America at this place, which my observations indicate to be the North Polar axis of the earth, and have formally taken possession of the entire region, and adjacent, for and in the name of the President of the United States of America.

When Peary reached Indian Harbor, Newfoundland in early September 1909, he sent President Taft a telegram:

William H. Taft, President of the United States, Washington, D. C: Have honor of placing North Pole at your disposal. R. E. Peary, U. S. N.

In contrast to the media headlines generated by Artur Chilingarov’s titanium flag-planting, Peary’s attempt to do precisely what Foreign Minister MacKay was so against produced at least one attention-grabbing headline in the September 9, 1909 edition of the San Francisco Call: “Taft Does not Want Pole.” Indeed, in partial response to Peary’s generous offer, President Taft replied, “Thanks for your interesting and generous offer. I do not know exactly what I could do with it.” Of course, there is an even more recent example of the United States flirting with the possibility of buying US sovereignty further into the Arctic. Not only in 1946 did the US propose to pay Denmark $100 million to buy Greenland, but according to National Public Radio, “No Joke: Trump Really Does Want to Buy Greenland” (NPR, August 19, 2019).

Although Greenland and Denmark made it clear to President Trump that Greenland was not an empty lot with a “For sale” sign, Trump’s fumbled attempt at a real estate deal did further highlight that the Arctic is increasingly viewed by some observers as an arena for geopolitical competition. It further drew attention to the fact that the Trump Administration has been slow to turn its attention to the Arctic region. Consequently, the Department of Defense and the Navy each recently issued Arctic strategy documents. And not only did the Coast Guard produce its own Arctic strategy document, but to augment its two operational polar icebreakers, the US Senate finally approved in summer 2019—after a two-decade delay—the Coast Guard’s request for funding to acquire the first of three planned new polar icebreakers. Although the acquisition of new icebreakers is clearly intended to defend and protect US interests in the Arctic, it is critical to note that the Coast Guard’s icebreakers are deliberately called “polar” because they operate in both the Arctic and Antarctic. Further, a significant proportion of icebreaker activities are conducted in support of the National Science Foundation’s (NSF) research activities in both polar regions. Thus, it is problematic to distinguish actual new White House policies from existing nor to identify statements made by President Trump concerning the Arctic. Perhaps the clearest—if unrevealing—statement offered by Trump on the Arctic was delivered after his meeting with the Finnish president on April 23, 2018: “Both leaders affirmed that it is essential to increase security in the Arctic.”

Although the Arctic has not been a high priority for the current president, as in other international policy domains his administration has nonetheless applied an uncooperative “America First” approach to interactions with both allies and competitors. Such an unnuanced strategy to international relations has led to uneven results and has even caused uneasiness between the United States and Canada, its principal Arctic partner. Although former Vice President Biden, Trump’s democratic rival in the approaching November 2020 presidential election, has offered sharp criticism of President Trump’s “America First” approach, he has not yet clearly outlined how his administration would work with Arctic state and non-state stakeholders. What is known, however, is that the major global challenge of climate change can only be solved if countries cooperate with each other and reject isolationism. What is also clear is that should Biden’s bid to become America’s 46th president be successful, his foreign policy priorities would include re-building trust and unity among US partners while pursuing cooperation with its perceived rivals on issues where interests converge, which notably includes climate change. Indeed, Biden was among the first US politicians to propose a climate change bill in the Senate: More than three decades ago, Biden introduced the Global Climate Protection Act of 1986. More recently, Biden spoke in January 2020 on the importance of protecting the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge from oil and gas drilling and development—a clear contrast with Trump’s attempts to encourage more fossil fuel production in Alaska.

The increasing economic and strategic importance of the circumpolar north requires more attention from US federal policymakers. The Trump administration’s neglect of Arctic policy has implications beyond—but obviously including—the extended Arctic region. As provocatively expressed in the Valdai Discussion Club’s June 10, 2020 concept paper, “The ‘Arctic triangle’ is emerging, consisting of the USA, Russia and China, whose capabilities, ambitions and diplomatic potential will determine the future development of the Arctic region.” Strengthening “Arctic Triangle” relations—and relations among all Arctic, near-Arctic, and non-Arctic stakeholders more generally—requires promoting possibilities where mutual interests can be developed; ensuring international laws and institutions will continue to be respected; and maintaining a peaceful and stable environment that is attractive to investors and protects indigenous communities. Despite disagreements over NATO’s potential role in the Arctic, the inclusion of non-Arctic states in Arctic governance, and the place of indigenous peoples in circumpolar decision making, both Russia and China maintain respect for regional governance structures and international institutions, in particular the Arctic Council. Whether through Trump’s benign neglect, or President Biden’s application of Obama era Arctic policies—and despite the National Geographic and other news media’s continued call for an “Arctic Cold War”—the United States will also continue to respect regional governance structures and international institutions, and to pursue cooperation in the Arctic.